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ABSTRACT 
Lawsuits against the government form a part of the regular 
functioning of legal systems in democratic countries, and respond-
ing to such lawsuits constitutes an unavoidable part of governance.  
However, in the context of authoritarian regimes, administrative 
litigation has been viewed as a distinctively valuable institution for 
promoting the rule of law and individual rights.  Moreover, the ju-
diciary is portrayed as the keystone to this institution and to the 
rule of law in general: the more powerful and competent is the ju-
diciary, the more it is able to “constrain government” through judi-
cial review.  Through empirical and comparative analyses of over 
two decades of administrative litigation in China against one of the 
state’s essential branches, tax collection, I challenge the utility of 
this normative conception of administrative litigation.  Using con-
ceptual tools that apply across legal systems and regulatory areas, I 
show that while litigant behavior as well as the regulatory envi-
ronment offer useful explanations of litigation patterns such as 
case volume and the plaintiff win rate, the relevance of judicial 
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quality is barely discernible.  This highlights the intuitive idea that 
judicial review can operate only when a private party brings suit, 
and whether and when they will do so cannot be taken for granted.  
In countries with weak legal systems, the rule of law may fail in 
certain basic ways that even a competent and well-subsidized judi-
ciary cannot remedy. 
Key words: administrative litigation, judicial review, rule of 
law, tax litigation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In democracies with strong traditions of the rule of law, litiga-
tion against the government, while generating important bodies of 
case law for various areas of government activity, is not itself 
viewed as a yardstick for evaluating the performance of legal sys-
tems.  In the United States, a probably widely shared view about 
litigation against government agencies is expressed by Professors 
Theodore Eisenberg and Henry Farber:  
“We suspect that, on average, the federal government is 
less fearful of litigation than are private litigants.  Govern-
ment is, after all, as permanent a secular institution as we 
have and has been litigating for hundreds of years.  Litiga-
tion to enforce laws and defend against attacks on laws and 
government policies is part of its routine.  Government is so 
large relative to most other litigants that it, more than the 
average litigant, knows substantial litigation will be a part 
of its existence.”1   
In other words, the occurrence of litigation to resolve disputes 
between the government and citizens is an epiphenomenal conse-
quence of the general functioning of the legal system and the 
(wide) scope of government’s activities.  One need not think of it as 
a distinct institution with a distinct purpose in itself.2  In countries 
1 Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, Government as Litigant: Further Tests 
of the Case Selection Model, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 94, 109 (2003).  
2 Correspondingly it need not constitute a distinct subject of study.  Thus in 
numerous quantitative studies of U.S. litigant behavior, lawsuits with government 
defendants are simply included as one type of litigation among many others.  See 
Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination 
Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 453 (1995) (showing that in employment discrimination cas-
es there are both private and government defendants); Peter Siegelman & Joel 
Waldfogel, Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes:  New Evidence through the Prism of the 
Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL. STUD. 101, 109 (1999) (defining the different types of 
parties such as individuals, labor unions, governmental entities, and foreign coun-
tries); Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty- Percent Rule: A Mul-
timodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (1996). 
In the large empirical literature studying judicial attitudes, lawsuits against gov-
ernment agencies offer particularly germane material for the examination of the 
ideological leanings of judges (e.g. whether they are pro-or anti-government).  For 
a review, see FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
(2007) (analyzing decisions made by the US district courts and arguing that while 
the courts' judges are influenced by ideology, legal requirements exercise a much 
stronger influence on their decisions).  But the fact that these lawsuits are brought 
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2017] DOES JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE MATTER? 945 
with civil law traditions, a special judicial branch is often created to 
adjudicate lawsuits against the government: a special recognition 
for disputes between the government and private parties can thus 
be said to be institutionalized, somewhat in contrast with the U.S. 
and other common law countries.3  The existence of an administra-
tive law branch of the judiciary, however, is not itself regarded as 
differentiating countries characterized by the rule of law from 
those that are not. 
In countries subject to authoritarian rule, by contrast, lawsuits 
against government agencies can assume a special symbolic status: 
they may be seen as providing rare instances of institutionalized 
constraint on the exercise of authoritarian power.4  Well-justified 
antipathy towards oppressive regimes that frequently trample rule 
of law norms has led legal professionals, scholars, the media and 
citizens in general to applaud lawsuits against the government 
(frequently labeled as “administrative litigation”) as a good thing 
in itself.5  Administrative litigation is thus strongly promoted by 
those who aspire to limit the power of bad government, especially 
when few other mechanisms of such constraint are available.6  
to courts in the first place is taken for granted. 
3 See generally, ZAIM M. NEDJATI & J.E. TRICE, ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL
SYSTEMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 35 (1979); Dominique Custos, Independent Admin-
istrative authorities in France: Structural and Procedural Change at the Intersection of 
Americanization, Europeanization and Gallicization, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 278 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth ed., 2010); Katharine Thomp-
son & Brian Jones, Administrative Law in the United Kingdom, in ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ITS MEMBER STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 177 (René 
Seerden ed., 3d ed. 2012) (arguing that the fact that England did not have an insti-
tutionally and doctrinally separate system of administrative law was distinctive 
from civil law countries and is considered by some as a virtue). 
4 See, e.g. Tom Ginsburg, Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents 
in Authoritarian Regimes, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 24 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa ed., 2008), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2006538 [https://perma.cc/T29B-S55T] (all page citations be-
low to this chapter are by reference to the SSRN version) (“Regardless of the result 
of these dynamics of interaction among multiple agents, administrative litigation 
and procedural rules will tend to constrain the government, even if these regime 
opponents are not successful in their particular lawsuits”).  
5 Kevin J. O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE IN RURAL CHINA 2 
(2006) (administrative litigation is a form of “rightful resistance”, which is “a form 
of popular contention that operates near the boundary of authorized channels, 
employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of 
power, hinges on locating and exploiting divisions within the state, and relies on 
mobilizing support from the wider public”). 
6 Id, at 103 (administrative litigation has led many “to reconsider their rela-
tionship to authority, while posing new questions, encouraging innovative tactics, 
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Conversely, administrative litigation has also been conceived as a 
distinct device with which the principals in an authoritarian re-
gime can monitor their agents.7  Once such positive valence, or at 
least distinct institutional purpose, is attached to administrative lit-
igation, it also becomes instinctive to view the quantity of such liti-
gation as well as litigation outcomes as meaningful indicators of 
how well the institution is serving its purpose.  In particular, low-
er-than-expected case volume and plaintiff win rates against the 
government are taken to reflect judicial weakness vis-a-vis the ex-
ecutive branch.  
 As natural as such reasoning may seem, it faces some serious 
theoretical and methodological difficulties.  To begin, there is no 
generally accepted theory predicting the quantity of litigation in a 
given jurisdiction, i.e. explaining why some countries are more “li-
tigious than others.”8  Consequently, it can be difficult to justify the 
implicit benchmarks used in making judgments such as that the 
volume of litigation or the rate of plaintiff wins in a country is “too 
low.”  In addition, with respect to the plaintiff win rates, the most 
compelling existing theory posits that the key determinant of such 
rates is the rate of settlement among litigants, which is itself de-
termined by the abilities of litigants to predict judicial outcomes, 
the cost of litigation, and the stakes the parties have in the dis-
putes.9  Plaintiff win rates, in other words, by themselves do little 
and spurring thoughts about political change.”) 
7 Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 10 (“Judicially supervised administrative proce-
dures, such as a right to a hearing, notice requirements, and a right to a statement 
of reasons for a decision, are a third mechanism for controlling agency costs.”). 
8 For recent discussions, see Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation as a Measure 
of Well-Being, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 247, 248 (2013) (“… higher litigation rates are not 
necessarily evidence of an overly litigious society or a drain on the economy; in 
fact, they can be a natural consequence of economic development and improved 
human well-being.”); Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Are Americans More 
Litigious? Some Quantitative Evidence, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE 
RULE OF LAW 66 (Frank Buckley ed., 2013).  
9 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (“According to our model, the determinants of settle-
ment and litigation are solely economic, including the expected costs to parties of
favorable or adverse decisions, the information that parties possess about the like-
lihood of success at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement.”); Joel
Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff
Victory, 103 J. POL. ECON. 229, 233 (1995) (“The settlement process acts as a filter on
filed cases. Cases go to trial only if the parties disagree substantially over the
probability of plaintiff victor . . . If the plaintiff and defendant have little uncer-
tainty about case quality or the decision standard, then only cases with true quali-
ty near the decision standard will be tried”).; Joel Waldfogel, The Selection of Cases
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss3/4
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to answer questions about whether the judiciary tends to side with 
the government, or whether the legal standard in a given area of 
dispute is otherwise too favorable to the government.  
This article explores these challenges regarding the interpreta-
tion of the outcomes of administrative litigation in authoritarian 
regimes through an in-depth case study.  I focus on one country, 
China, and litigation in one fundamental area of government activ-
ity, taxation.  Because of its authoritarian government and weak 
rule of law,10 administrative litigation in China has long been held 
as an emblem of instruments for constraining government.  Ever 
since the 1980s, both Chinese and foreign scholars have resorted to 
the study of administrative litigation as a way of assessing the de-
velopment of China’s legal system.11  Various authors have also 
for Trial, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 420 (Pe-
ter Newman ed., 1998) (“The plaintiff’s settlement demand, and the defendant’s 
settlement offer, are formed non-strategically based on their estimates of the 
probability of plaintiff’s success at trial along with the parties’ respective costs of 
trial and settlement…”); Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Trial Selection Theory and 
Evidence: A Review, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 487 (2d ed., Chris 
Sanchirico ed., 2012). 
10 PITMAN POTTER, CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM 192–93 (2013) (explaining how Chi-
na continues to be an authoritarian regime that has a weak rule of law because it 
tends to subdue civil and political rights to the authority of the Party); Benjamin J. 
Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q. 620, 641–42 (2007) (show-
ing that although China has made efforts to strengthen its legal system, the role of 
judges has not been sufficiently strengthened); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S 
LONG MARCH TOWARDS RULE OF LAW 247, 513 (2002) (showing that China is in 
transition from rule by law to a version of rule of law); Stanley Lubman, Bird in a 
Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years, 20 NW. J. INTL L. & BUS. 383, 385, 408 
(2000) (explaining that Chinese authoritarianism is fragmented due to decentrali-
zation and that makes it difficult for comprehensive legal reform); KEVIN J.
O’BRIEN, REFORM WITHOUT LIBERALIZATION: CHINA’S NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS 
AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 13, 20 (2008). 
11 See, e.g., Pitman Potter, The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC: Judicial 
Review and Bureaucratic Reform, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 270 
(Pitman Potter ed., 1994) (explaining that the Administrative Litigation Law rep-
resents a culmination of the legal reform effort by providing a framework for ap-
plying positivist legal regulation to administrative action); Minxin Pei, Citizens v. 
Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China, 152 CHINA Q. 832, 859 (1997) (“The 
evidence presented and analyzed in this study shows that, although the con-
straints of China’s closed political system seriously limit the effectiveness of the 
ALL, the institution of judicial review of administrative actions is gradually being 
consolidated.”); David Weller, The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China: Legal Means 
for Foreign Investors to Challenge Agency Action, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1238, 1282 (1998) 
(showing that the Administrative Litigation Law and other regulations provide a 
basis on which to challenge abusive acts by administrative agencies); Kevin J. 
O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural Chi-
na, 51 CHINA J. 75, 93–94 (2004) (arguing that evidence shows that administrative 
litigation in China still faces great hurdles because the judicial system still remains 
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held forth putative evidence of low case volumes and low plaintiff 
win rates as confirming the lack of independence on the part of the 
Chinese judiciary.12  While Chinese tax litigation has generally at-
tracted little attention to date, when instances of such litigation are 
reported in the media, they are also quickly portrayed as respond-
ing to oppressive government actions (and reflecting Chinese 
courts’ general inability to constrain such actions).13  Overall, both 
deeply embedded with politics); Donald Clarke et al., The Role of Law in China’s 
Economic Development, in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 375 (Thomas 
Rawski & Loren Brandt ed., 2008); Ji Li, Suing the Leviathan – An Empirical Analysis 
of the Changing Rate of Administrative Litigation in China, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 815, 815 (2013) (analyzing the changing rate of administrative litigation in 
China to evaluate social litigiousness, state-society relations in authoritarian re-
gimes, Chinese elite politics, and Chinese administrative law); Margaret Y.K. 
Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese Courts, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE 
OF LAW IN CHINA 163, 174, 183, 190 (Karen G. Turner et al. ed., 2000) (explaining 
that although the Administrative Litigation Law provides individuals the proce-
dure to challenge decisions of officials, it does not allow the administrative rule 
itself to be challenged); Lubman, supra note 10, at 392 (“No-
where is the difficulty of improving Chinese legality better illustrated than in 
the hesitantly developing field of administrative law”).  
12 Xin He & Yang Su, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Shanghai Courts, 10 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 139 (2013) (“Scholarship has pointed out the obvious 
absence of judicial independence, and journalists and folk in the streets all know 
about the penetrable courts”); Ji Li, Dare You Sue the Tax Collectors? An Empirical 
Study of Tax-Related Administrative Lawsuits in China, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J. 57, 69 
(2014) (“Judicial weakness and bias favoring state agencies and high costs of 
agency retaliation explain the strong reluctance to file lawsuits against tax agen-
cies in China”); He Haibo (何海波), Kundun de Xingzheng Susong (困顿的行政诉讼) 
[The wearied state of administrative litigation], 2012 HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE 
XUEBAO (华东政法大学学报) [JOURNAL OF THE EAST CHINA UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL 
SCIENCE AND LAW] no. 2. 
13 See James Fallows, More on the Detained Chinese Lawyer, THE ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2009/08/more-
on-the-detained-chinese-lawyer/22546 [https://perma.cc/C3B7-CXGY] Evan Os-
nos, Where is Xu Zhiyong? THE NEW YORKER (Jul. 31, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/evan-osnos/where-is-xu-zhiyong [https://
perma.cc/UJ57-KWB4] (describing the detention of a civil rights lawyer for pur-
ported tax evasion); Ben Blanchard & Yoko Nishikawa, China demands Ai Weiwei 
pay $1.85 million in taxes, fines, REUTERS (Jun. 28, 2011, 8:29 AM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/28/us-china-artist-idUSTRE75L3U520110628 
[https://perma.cc/9Z69-LGFF] (describing that dissident Chinese artist Ai Wei-
wei, who was asked to pay 12 million yuan ($1.85 million) in back taxes); Andrew 
Jacobs, Chinese Artist Is Barred From His Own Hearing, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jun. 
20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/asia/supporters-take-
up-chinese-artist-ai-weiwei-s-cause-at-court.html?_r=3&ref=world [https://
perma.cc/Z77U-7EAZ] (describing how dissident artist was prevented from at-
tending the hearing where his tax case was being litigated); Sui-Lee Wee, Chinese 
Court Upholds Fine Against Dissident Ai Weiwei, REUTERS (Sep. 27, 2012, 10:21 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/us-china-dissident-idUSBRE88P0J
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss3/4
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popular and academic discussions of Chinese administrative litiga-
tion display a high degree of consensus with respect to two claims.  
First, both the volume and outcome of administrative litigation are 
chiefly functions of the distribution of powers between the Chinese 
judiciary and the executive branch—in short, of judicial independ-
ence.14  Second, administrative litigation is a good thing in itself, 
and judicial institutions should be reformed to deliver a greater 
amount of that good.   
By examining empirical information relating to Chinese tax lit-
igation spanning over two decades, I come to conclusions that 
challenge this consensus.  I present four sets of findings, obtained 
from applying different devices of empirical and comparative 
analysis.  First, certain instinctive judgments in reaction to seem-
ingly low case volume and plaintiff win rates in Chinese tax litiga-
tion are hard to justify, in light of available cross-country compara-
tive information.15  Second, I situate Chinese tax litigation in the 
context of a multi-year, multi-agency study of what disputes 
against the government are brought to Chinese courts and result in 
720120927 [https://perma.cc/LGA5-PJK3] (explaining that the Chinese court up-
held the decision to impose a fine for back taxes on the dissident artist).  
14 Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 24 (“the administrative litigation scheme can be-
come an effective arena of political contestation. However, the regime may also 
seek to tighten control over the courts to inhibit them from becoming a major lo-
cus of social and political change.”) 
15 This argument is informed by comparative tax dispute resolution infor-
mation generated by both scholarly studies and a variety of professional sources. 
For scholarly studies in the U.S., see, e.g. Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to 
Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
315, 318 (1999) (studying whether trials are non-random, and determining which 
factors predict that a case will go to trial); Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, 
Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax 
Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1235 (2006) (presenting an em-
pirical study on the effects of having legal representation in a tax litigation case); 
in Canada, see Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, Policy Preferences and Expertise in 
Canadian Tax Adjudication, 62 CANADIAN TAX J. 985 (2014) (reporting an empirical 
study about both judicial decision making generally and tax decisions in particu-
lar, to examine the effect of judicial policy preferences and expertise on outcomes 
of challenges to tax decisions); in Japan, see J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Ras-
musen, Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 594 (1999) 
(showing evidence that in Japan, the government party to a tax litigation wins be-
cause, as a rational repeat player, it disproportionately selects for litigation those 
cases that will shift precedent to its advantage); in Israel, David Gliksberg, Does 
the Law Matter? Win Rates and Law Reforms, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 378 (2014) 
(describing an empirical study which showed that litigants’ win rates changed af-
ter a fundamental and major law reform). Additional scholarly and professional 
sources are cited in Part 2 infra.  
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judicial decisions.16  Cross-agency comparisons furnish credible ev-
idence that Chinese plaintiffs tend to encounter particularly ad-
verse outcomes in litigating against tax agencies; but this may be 
the result of both information asymmetry between plaintiffs and 
defendants and adverse legal standards based on statutes, and 
need not indicate judicial bias favoring tax agency defendants.  
Third, I assembled the largest set of published Chinese judicial de-
cisions in tax cases to date,17 and systematically analyzed the con-
tent of the decisions.18  I argue, based on such a comprehensive re-
view, that the available evidence is consistent with the view that 
the Chinese judiciary is (and has been for some time) able to adju-
dicate tax disputes with competence and reasonable neutrality. 19  
Fourth and finally, a separate study of Chinese tax administration, 
which forms the essential background of dispute resolution on tax 
matters, was carried out.20  That study suggests that the low level 
of tax litigation in China can well be explained by the organization 
of Chinese tax administration, which permits a high frequency of 
informal interactions among taxpayers and tax collectors. This ex-
planation implies, however, that the volume of litigation may re-
main low regardless of improvements in the Chinese judiciary.  
Collectively, these findings imply that inferences about the 
power of the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive branch on the basis of 
16 The details of the study are set out in Wei Cui & Zhiyuan Wang, The Selec-
tion of Disputes against Government Agencies: Evidence from a Civil Law System, forth-
coming in Review of Law and Economics.  
17 The case sample size is, to my knowledge, the largest among existing stud-
ies in English that analyze Chinese administrative litigation decisions, whether 
generally or within specific regulatory areas. 
18 Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial 
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63 (2008) (explaining that systematic content analysis is a 
technique that enables lawyers to read and analyze decisions more systematically 
and objectively). All decisions in the sample were coded intensively, using a score 
sheet of over 30 questions. The content analysis performed captures a large num-
ber of features of the decisions, providing a rich set of information about the sub-
stantive and procedural aspects of the cases. 
19 The details of this study are fully reported in Cui Wei (崔威), Zhongguo 
Shuiwu Xingzheng Susong Shizheng Yanjiu (中国税务行政诉讼实证研究) [An Empirical 
Study of Tax Litigation in China], 2015 QINGHUA FAXUE (清华法学) [TSINGHUA
UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL] no.3, 135. 
20 For a preliminary exposition, see Wei Cui, Administrative Decentralization 
and Tax Compliance: A Transactional Cost Perspective, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 186 (2015) 
(arguing that decentralization increases communication costs related to the im-
plementation of the law and changes the structure of taxpayer’s costs in acquiring 
knowledge of the law, and that this dynamic frustrates tax administration reform 
in China).  
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litigation volume and judicial outcomes are highly unreliable, be-
cause these observable patterns are determined primarily by other 
factors.  This conclusion would not itself be very remarkable if 
reached in the context of a developed legal system.  In the U.S., for 
example, the dominant approach to analyzing civil litigation pat-
terns is to assume that they are driven by litigants’ rational 
choice.21  However, scholars have succumbed to the temptation to 
depart from this approach when engaging with the legal systems 
in authoritarian countries.  I argue that portraying administrative 
litigation as a self-standing institution imbued with a distinct pur-
pose (i.e. offering opportunities for plaintiffs and courts to con-
strain an otherwise unconstrained government)22 has limited bene-
fits, particularly given its risk of generating spurious explanations.  
 The article proceeds as follows.  Part 2 provides background 
information regarding patterns of Chinese tax litigation and dis-
cusses how these patterns are inadequately explained by prevail-
ing views of Chinese administrative litigation.  Part 3 first consid-
ers the procedural features of Chinese tax litigation that may 
explain some of the litigation patterns.  It then presents evidence of 
a correlation between the settlement rate during litigation and 
plaintiff win rate, which suggests that the “trial selection theory” of 
disputes widely applied in studying litigation outcomes in the U.S. 
may also apply to China.  According to this theory, non-
independent (or incompetent) courts are only one among several 
equally plausible explanations for plaintiffs’ poor odds in tax litiga-
tion.  Part 4 then investigates the strength of evidence for attrib-
uting taxpayer’s poor chances to an underperforming judiciary.  I 
describe select findings based on the extensive content analysis of 
case law, and argue that neither qualitative nor quantitative evi-
dence supports the hypothesis of judicial non-independence.  Stat-
utory biases and information asymmetries between litigants are at 
least equally good explanations of low plaintiff win rates.  Part 5 
then explains how the main cause of low tax litigation volume may 
lie in the structure of Chinese tax administration.  Part 6 reviews 
21 See especially the sources cited in supra note 9.  See also STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW PART IV (2004) (Providing a detailed 
analysis of the economic approach to analyzing the litigation process); Kathleen 
Spier, Litigation, 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 259 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell ed., 2007). 
22 See Ginsburg supra note 4, at 24 (“administrative litigation…will tend to 
constrain the government, even if…regime opponents are [often] not successful in 
their particular lawsuits.”). 
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the implications of these findings for the discourse associating ad-
ministrative litigation with the promotion of the rule of law.  A 
brief Conclusion follows. 
2. BASIC FACTS:  CASE VOLUME, PLAINTIFF WIN RATE, AND RATE OF
ADJUDICATION IN CHINESE TAX LITIGATION 
 Interest in tax litigation has grown among Chinese tax and le-
gal professionals in the last few years.23  As a result of Chinese 
courts’ recent extraordinary practice of publishing all decisions 
that are not politically sensitive,24 a massive amount of case law of 
all varieties has come to the public light in the last few years, and 
tax litigation is no exception.  Chinese tax practitioners are discuss-
ing case law much more so than they ever did before, and tax advi-
sors are beginning to advise clients to consider the option of litiga-
tion where they have not before.25 
However, lest one hasten to the conclusion that this growing 
interest is attributable to a rising wave of tax litigation, some sober-
ing statistics should be considered.  According to data published 
by China’s Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”),26 the quantity of first–
instance tax litigation in China experienced a significant decline 
since the late 1990s:  as Chart 1 indicates, close to 2,000 cases a year 
were brought at the beginning of this period; the number declined 
to around 1,000 a year by 2004, and to around 300 by 2007; they 
23 The first administrative law case that China’s Supreme People’s Court 
(SPC) tried after a much anticipated revision of the Administrative Litigation Law 
in 2014 was a lawsuit against the local tax bureau. Luo Shuzhen (罗书臻), Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan Gongkai Kaiting Shenli Xin Xiugai Xingzheng Susong Fa Shishi Hou 
Diyi Qi Xingzheng Anjian (最高人民法院公开开庭审理新修改行政诉讼法实施后第一起行政案件) 
[The First Administrative Litigation Case Tried in a Public Hearing at the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court After the Implementation of the Newly Amended Administrative Litigation 
Law]; RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (人民法院报) [PEOPLE'S COURT DAILY] (June 29, 2015). 
24 For a discussion of the recent publication practice of Chinese courts, see 
infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.  
25 For a discussion of the prior reluctance of foreign investors to challenge the 
actions of Chinese tax agencies, see Wei Cui, Foreign Administrative Law and Inter-
national Taxation: A Case Study of Treaty Implementation in China, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 
191, 217-219 (2012).  
26 For a discussion of the nature of the SPC data, see Cui supra note 16.  Since 
the late 1980s, the data has appeared in the annual China Law Yearbook 
(中国法律年鉴). Law Yearbook of China, LAWINFOCHINA.COM.  Unless otherwise indicat-
ed, all data regarding the quantity of administrative litigation and manners in 
which such cases are disposed provided in this Article come from this source. 
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have stayed around 400 a year more recently.  SPC data indicates 
that the ratio of tax litigation to the total volume of (first instance) 
administrative litigation in China also declined from 2.4% in 2000 
to 0.3% in 2013.  While tax disputes became rarer during this peri-
od, administrative litigation grew as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
Thus, in both absolute and relative terms, the volume of Chi-
nese tax litigation may seem low in some intuitive ways.  The abso-
lute number of cases a year––around 400––looks low relative to 
China’s population and the size of its economy.  The U.S. Tax 
Court alone sees around 30,000 cases docketed a year.27  India, a 
country with a comparable population size to China, also sees over 
20,000 first instance tax cases a year.28  China’s tax litigation vol-
ume is more comparable to Japan’s, which legal scholars have 
treated as a low-litigation jurisdiction.29  
27 HAROLD DUBROFF & BRENT J. HELLWIG, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 72–73 (2d ed. 2014), https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/
book/Dubroff_Hellwig.pdf [https://perma.cc/52H5-NQ6C].  Unlike the United 
States and a small number of other countries, China has no specialized tax courts–
–given the small quantity of tax litigation each year, creating such a court would
be hard to justify.  Tax cases, along with other types of administrative litigation,
are tried by administrative law tribunals that can be found in most courts at vari-
ous levels across the country.
28 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, NAVIGATING TAX CONTROVERSY IN INDIA 15
(2014), http://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2014/navigating-tax-
controversy-in-india-october-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ58-FQEY].  
29 Ramseyer, supra note 15, at 594 (reporting there were 189 and 154 cases of 
tax litigation, including appeals, in Japan in 1989 and 1994, respectively); see also 
Akihiro Hironaka, Michito Kitamura & Masaki Noda, Japan, in THE TAX DISPUTES 
0
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Chart 1: Quantity of Tax Litigation in China, 1998-2013 
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However, these crude comparative figures need to be viewed 
with caution:  since comparative tax litigation data is not generally 
available, it is difficult to know which countries constitute the 
norm and which countries constitute the outliers.  Even the United 
States’ and India’s tax litigation volumes are dwarfed by the num-
ber of tax cases in Italy30 and Brazil.31  Thus, perhaps a more per-
suasive assessment would refer to the fact that the Chinese tax bu-
reaucracy employs more than 10% of China’s civil servants, and 
tax administration clearly touches on the everyday operation of 
every Chinese business.32  Given the size of the tax branch of the 
Chinese administrative state, even the 2.4% of tax cases in 2000 rel-
ative to the total volume of litigation against the government seems 
disproportionately low, not to mention the 0.3% found in recent 
years.33 
Equally striking, of course, is the decline in tax litigation in the 
last ten years.  There are different hypotheses that would explain 
this decline, none of which can, at present, be confirmed.  One is 
that Chinese tax administration practice has possibly improved in 
terms of greater conformity to rule of law norms.34  Changing ad-
AND LITIGATION REVIEW 162, 164 (Simon Whitehead ed., 2d ed. 2014), 
https://www.jurists.co.jp/sites/default/files/tractate_pdf/en/The_Tax_Dispute
_Litigation_Review2_Japan_.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CLS-QB6N] (stating Japan 
reported 294 tax lawsuits in 2013).  It is worth noting, however, that in recent 
years the Canadian Tax Court has decided on average only 600 cases a year, even 
though Canada does not have a reputation for being a “low litigation” jurisdic-
tion.  See Alarie & Green, supra note 15, at 996. 
30 247,911 tax cases decided by and 510,236 tax cases pending at the Court of 
First Instance in 2013.  SISTEMA STATISTICO NAZIONALE, RELAZIONE SUL
MONITORAGGIO DELLO STATO DEL CONTENZIOSO TRIBUTARIO E SULL’ATTIVITA’ DELLE 
COMMISSIONI TRIBUTARIE [MONITORING REPORT ON THE STATE OF LITIGATION AND 
ACTIVITY OF TAX COMMISSIONS] 45 (June 2015), http://www.finanze.it/
export/sites/finanze/it/.content/Documenti/Contenzioso/Relazione_
monitoraggio_contenzioso_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3HN-F8YW]. 
31 See Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, Brazil: The Land of Many Lawyers And Very 
Slow Justice, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Nov. 05, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/11/05/359830235/brazil-the-land-
of-many-lawyers-and-very-slow-justice [https://perma.cc/EQS7-58CJ] (stating 
that there are 1,660,000 cases in progress in the court dealing with tax avoidance 
in Sao Paulo alone). 
32 See Cui, supra note 20, at 201. 
33 See Ramseyer supra note 15, (showing figures suggesting tax litigation 
comprises between 20% and one-third of all civil lawsuits against the government 
in Japan). 
34 The Chinese police also saw a substantial decline in both the absolute and 
relative quantities of lawsuits brought against it––a drop of one-third and over 
80%, respectively––in the same period,  and some Chinese scholars have been 
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ministration practices may also be relevant.  It has been reported 
that tax agencies have in recent years adopted more “collabora-
tive” forms of tax collection and applied penalties less frequently.35  
Tax disputes may be predicted to decrease as a result.36  Another 
hypothesis for explaining the decline of tax litigation, with a differ-
ent thrust, is that the revision in 2000 of the Law on the Admin-
istration of Tax Collection,37 the general procedural statute for tax 
administration, significantly expanded the powers of tax agencies, 
legitimized certain agency practices that had previously been con-
troversial, and otherwise made it more difficult for lawsuits 
against tax agencies to be brought.38  Yet another hypothesis is that 
it was the high volume of tax litigation in the late 1990s that was 
abnormal, attributable possibly to the rapid changes in the organi-
zation of tax administration in China during that time.39  The 
steady, lower level of tax litigation in recent years merely repre-
sents a reversion to the mean.  Because of the lack of information 
about Chinese tax litigation in the 1990s,40 it is difficult to confirm 
or disconfirm any of these hypotheses.  Note, though, none of these 
hypotheses refers to the quality of Chinese courts at all. 
willing to attribute this to improved policing practice.  He, supra note 12, at 88. 
35 Whether an agency adopts a collaborative or adversarial approach to regu-
lation arguably has no direct implications for the assessment of the agency under 
rule of law norms.  For a discussion of Chinese tax agencies’ experiments in recent 
years with more collaborative approaches to tax collection, see Qian Junwen (钱俊
文) & Wei Guoqing (韦国庆), Nashui Pinggu de Hefa Xing Zhengyi Jiqi Jiejue (纳
税评估的合法性争议及其解决) [The Controversy of Legal Status of Tax Assessment and its So-
lution], 2013 SHUIWU YANJIU (税务研究)  [TAXATION RESEARCH] no. 1 72.  For an anal-
ysis of the adoption of such collaborative forms in other Chinese regulatory agen-
cies, see, e.g., Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Gerald E. Fryxell & Benjamin van Rooij, 
Changes in Regulatory Enforcement Styles Among Environmental Enforcement Officials 
in China, 41 ENV’T. & PLAN. 1 (EU-China Bus. Mgmt. Training, Working Paper No. 
003, Nov. 2009), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Benjamin_Van_Rooij/
publication/46559868_Changes_in_Regulatory_Enforcement_Styles_Among_
Environmental_Enforcement_Officials_in_China/links/546209440cf27487b4557
b2b.pdf [https://perma.cc/AY9E-5RKH].  
36 Note that accepting this explanation can affect one’s view of what level of 
litigation is “too low”:  One should be less inclined to view the current level of tax 
litigation as abnormally low, if its decline from a previously more “normal-
looking” level has a ready explanation. 
37 Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Shuishou Zhengshou Guanli Fa 
(中华人民共和国税收征收管理法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning 
Administration of Tax Collection] (adopted by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's 
Cong., Sep. 4, 1992, and effective on May 1, 2001) [hereinafter LATC]. 
38 See infra notes 135–37.  
39 See Cui, supra note 20, at 201. 
40 See infra note 88.  
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Fluctuations in litigation levels are unique neither to tax agen-
cies nor to China.  In countries enjoying high levels of rule of law, 
both the level at any given time and fluctuations over time in ad-
ministrative litigation volumes simply remain esoteric facts:  they 
are rarely noticed and even more rarely highlighted as demanding 
explanation.41  However, when administrative litigation is held to 
symbolize mechanisms of constraining authoritarian power, its 
volume becomes imbued with significance.  Moreover, instead of 
offering hypotheses like the ones just described, scholars of Chi-
nese law who find the level of administrative litigation lower than 
they expect often take such low case volume to impugn the court 
system.42  Such commentary displays two implicit assumptions:  
first, the actions or inactions of courts are the primary determi-
nants of observed litigation patterns; second, since administrative 
litigation is a good thing, a lower-than-expected level of such liti-
gation indicates under-performance or even a malfunction of the 
courts.43  Yet at least in the tax context, these assumptions fit un-
comfortably with the data.  If they were held onto, declining litiga-
tion volume would imply that Chinese judiciary became less inde-
pendent vis-à-vis tax agencies over time, and/or that tax agencies 
became more powerful relative to other agencies over time.  But 
there is no independent reason to embrace or even consider such 
claims.  
41 In U.S. tax scholarship, I am aware of only one instance of such attention. 
See Yehonatan Givati, Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Advance 
Tax Rulings, 29 VA. TAX REV. 137, 146 (2009) (noting a greater than 50% drop of tax 
cases filed in the United States between 1996 and 2000 and complete recovery in 
the years afterwards, and stating that such fluctuation “calls for further re-
search”). 
42 See, e.g., He, supra note 12, at 88 (suggesting low level of tax litigation also 
signals a failure of the public remedy system); Rachel E. Stern, The Political Logic of 
China's New Environmental Courts, 72 CHINA J. 53, 54 (2014) (noting an inadequate 
quantity of environmental litigation and suggesting that courts must do more to 
increase such quantity).  A recent study argued that the level of tax litigation con-
firms a “shared understanding [among commentators on Chinese law] that local 
courts do not normally adjudicate administrative lawsuits against government 
agencies impartially and judicial bias is presumably more serious when powerful 
agencies, such as tax bureaus, are sued.”  Li, supra note 12, at 58 (footnotes omit-
ted). 
43 See Li, supra note 11, at 840 (“After years of complaints about political in-
tervention, the SPC in 2008 allowed local courts to move or upgrade the trials of 
certain administrative lawsuits.  The scheme was to assure that administrative ad-
judication be insulated from direct influence of the defendant or its related state 
organs.  The regression results indicate that, all else equal, such measures failed to 
create more lawsuits.”). 
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Another implicit assumption of previous commentary on Chi-
nese administrative litigation is that plaintiff win rates serve as a 
specific mechanism through which the actions of Chinese courts 
may affect litigation volume.  More specifically, plaintiff win rates 
reflect judicial attitudes, and low plaintiff win rates, reflecting judi-
cial bias in favor of government defendants, could deter litiga-
tion.44  What do we know about plaintiff win rates in tax litigation?  
The SPC also offers information about the ways in which tax cases 
are disposed, which can be classified into plaintiff wins and losses.  
Using this information, for each year I calculate two rates, the 
“plaintiff win rate” and the “adjudication rate.”  Chart 2 maps the 
evolution of both the plaintiff win rate and the adjudication rate for 
tax litigation over the course of sixteen years.  It can be seen that 
the adjudication rate has largely followed an inverse U–shaped de-
velopment––with a blip in 2005–06––going from a low of 24.4% in 
1998 to a high of 67.5% in 2004 and back to 32.1% in 2010.  Plaintiff 
win rates went from a high point of 26% in 1998 down to 9.5% in 
2001 and back to 16.7% in 2012.  Thus, in the late 1990s, when more 
lawsuits were brought against tax agencies, both the rate of with-
drawal of lawsuits and the rate of plaintiff wins were also higher.  
 
 
 
Are Chinese taxpayer–plaintiffs’ odds of winning too low, and 
could this be why few lawsuits are brought?  Cross-country com-
parative information again offers no support for these assessments. 
Plaintiff win rates in U.S. tax and district courts have been reported 
44 For a discussion on low plaintiff win rates and deterred litigation, see He & 
Su, supra note 12, at 139 and Li supra note 12, at 109–10.  
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to range from 15%45 to 29%,46 which are not much higher than Chi-
na’s.47  While higher plaintiff win rates have been reported for oth-
er countries, those countries do not always have higher (per capita) 
litigation volumes.48  Although such comparative information is 
quite limited, it still warns us that, with no further theory, we 
should have little confidence that judicial biases and judicial capac-
ity offer even relevant explanations of case volume and observed 
litigation outcome, let alone the most important ones.  
The next Part will examine a number of features of Chinese 
dispute resolution institutions that are clearly relevant to under-
standing case volume and litigation outcome.  Chinese institutions 
share each of these features with many other countries, although 
some combination of features may be more unique.  One such fea-
ture is the availability of administrative remedies.  In China, as in 
many other countries, the appeal of the action of a government 
agency within the executive branch, before a dispute is brought to 
courts, is either a requirement or a right that is commonly exer-
cised.  This may systematically reduce litigation volume, and also 
indirectly affect observed plaintiff win rates.  Similarly, any cost to 
the pursuit of formal dispute resolution—such as the requirement 
that Chinese taxpayers face to pay the disputed tax liability before 
even bringing an appeal within the executive branch—could also 
suppress litigation volume and affect the outcome of cases that are 
brought to courts.  More generally, the costs of dispute resolution 
may lead to settlements at different points after a dispute arises, 
conditional upon the litigants’ respective expectations and degrees 
of uncertainty.  Litigants’ rational choices in light of these costs and 
45 Daniel M. Schneider, Using the Social Background Model to Explain Who Wins 
Federal Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer?, 25 VA. 
TAX REV. 201, 224 (2005) (basing calculation on 1,292 randomly sampled tax cases 
in the federal circuit courts between 1996 and 2000). 
46 Daniel M. Schneider, Assessing and Predicting Who Wins Federal Tax Trial 
Decisions, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.  473, 519, T.A8 (2002) (studying 482 randomly 
sampled cases form U.S. Tax Court and U.S. District Courts during the 1979–1998 
period).  
47 One professional article reports that taxpayers in Germany also win only 
20% of the first instance cases.  Michael Hendricks, Germany, in TAX DISPUTES AND 
LITIGATION REVIEW 101, 102 (Simon Whitehead ed., 2d ed. 2014). 
48 For example, Alarie and Green report a close to 50% taxpayer win rate in 
the Canadian Tax Court, but the volume of tax litigation is low in Canada com-
pared to the United States and to other countries with lower reported win rates, 
e.g., Italy.  For litigation volume in Canada and Italy, see supra notes 15 and 30. Ita-
ly’s taxpayer’s win rate was between 30% and 40% in 2013. See SISTEMA STATISTICO
NAZIONALE, supra note 30, at 14.
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subject to these information constraints could easily reduce or 
eliminate the effect of judicial bias (or capacity) on observed litiga-
tion outcome.49  It is only by taking these institutional factors into 
account—as urged by some of the most influential contemporary 
theories about legal systems—that one can begin to make infer-
ences from litigation patterns. 
3. INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS:  EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND SETTLEMENTS DURING LITIGATION 
3.1.  Settlement Prior to and as a Result of Administrative Appeal 
The option to pursue administrative appeals prior to litigation 
is an important feature distinguishing administrative litigation 
from other types of civil litigation.  It implies the existence of an in-
stitutionalized procedure for resolving disputes between private 
parties and the government, before the disputes reach courts.  Just 
as settlements during litigation reduce the number of cases tried by 
judges, appeals within the executive branch reduce the number of 
cases docketed with courts in the first place.  While negotiations 
prior to potential plaintiffs’ decisions to bring suit also lead to set-
tlements and reduce the number of cases docketed in other types of 
civil disputes, administrative appeal, as a public institution, often 
requires the government to record the quantity of disputes be-
tween it and private parties and the manners in which they are re-
solved pre-litigation.  This type of pre-litigation settlement, there-
fore, may be more observable than in other areas. 
In China, the administrative remedy that is available to citizens 
as an alternative to, or an option prior to, seeking judicial remedies 
is called administrative reconsideration (“AR”).50  For tax disputes, 
49  Law and economic analysis of the outcomes of civil litigation in the United 
States generally demonstrate—or assume—the elimination of such effects of judi-
cial biases.  See Hylton & Lin, supra note 9; see also SHAVELL, supra note 21.  
50 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa (中华人民共和国行政复议法) 
[Administrative Reconsideration Law], LAWINFOCHINA.COM, (promulgated by the 
Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999); see also Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa Shishi Tiaoli (中华人民共和国行政复议法实施条例) 
[Regulation on the Implementation of the Administrative Reconsideration Law], 
LAWINFOCHINA.COM, (promulgated by the St. Council, May 29, 2007, effective Aug. 
1, 2007). 
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AR possesses special significance, because in all disputes regarding 
the assessments of deficient tax payments, AR is a remedy that 
must be exhausted before judicial review is available.51  But not all 
disputes with tax agencies go through AR first.  For disputes re-
garding the imposition of a civil penalty, an enforcement action or 
a seizure to secure tax payment, the taxpayer may choose either to 
apply for an AR or directly bring a complaint to court.  Litigated 
cases therefore involve a mixture of disputes that have gone 
through the AR process and those that have not.  Previous studies 
based on limited case samples suggest that litigated tax cases that 
are preceded by AR represent over 35% of all tax lawsuits.52  This is 
higher than the proportion of litigation preceded by AR in the 
overall population of administrative litigation, which has been es-
timated to be around 20%.53  The difference reflects the fact that, 
unlike in the United States, where the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is a general administrative law doctrine broadly applica-
ble across most agencies,54 the requirement is imposed in China on-
ly on less than a handful of agencies and subject areas other than 
tax agencies and the assessment of tax deficiencies. 
Could this fact be relevant to understanding why the volume of 
tax litigation is distinctly low relative to total administrative litiga-
tion?  Suppose two agencies, A and B, face the same amount of po-
tential disputes, but disputes against A can go to court directly 
while disputes against B must go through AR first.  If AR is able to 
51 See LATC, supra note 37, art. 88 (“If any tax dispute between the tax au-
thority and a taxpayer, withholding agent or tax payment guarantor occurs, the 
taxpayer, withholding agent or tax payment guarantor must first pay or remit the 
taxes and the late fee in accordance with the decision on tax payment made by the 
tax authority, or provide corresponding guaranty, and then may, apply for an 
administrative reconsideration in accordance with the law.  If they object to the 
decision made after the administrative reconsideration, they may bring a suit in 
the people’s court in accordance with the law.”); see also Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi 
Guize (税务行政复议规则) [Rules for Tax Administration Reconsideration], 
LAWINFOCHINA.COM, (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Feb. 10, 2010, effec-
tive Apr. 1, 2010) (defining procedures of administrative appeals against all tax 
agencies). 
52 See Cui, supra note 19, at 141; Huang Qihui (黄启辉), Xingzheng Susong 
Yishen Shenpan Zhuangkuang Yanjiu (行政诉讼一审审判状况研究) [A Study of First Instance 
Adjudication of Administrative Lawsuits], 4 QINGHUA FAXUE (清华法学) [TSINGHUA
UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL] 73, 80 (2013).  
53 See Xin He, Administrative Reconsideration’s Erosion of Administrative Litiga-
tion in China, 2 CHINA J. COMP. L. 252, 252 (2014) (discussing AR decisions in China 
from 1980s to present).  
54  See generally, KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATIES § 15.1 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing exhaustion, finality, and ripeness). 
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resolve many disputes, the number of lawsuits against B should be 
much lower than the number of lawsuits against A. 
Unfortunately, this factor explains fairly little.  In a previous 
study, I calculated that among tax disputes that are brought to AR, 
around 14% go on to be litigated.55  This implies that only about 
1,000 AR procedures a year are pursued by Chinese taxpayers,56 
which seems like a miniscule number in light of the sheer size of 
the Chinese tax administration and the prominence taxation holds 
for most businesses.  To understand the low case-load in courts, 
one must understand why taxpayers do not tend to seek adminis-
trative review of tax agencies’ assessments of deficiencies to begin 
with. 
For those who are inclined to explain litigation outcomes in 
terms of features of judicial institutions, one explanation may come 
to mind.  Perhaps Chinese taxpayers believe that anyone in the ex-
ecutive branch reviewing a tax agency action during an AR pro-
ceeding is likely to be biased in favor of the government.57  If they 
also believe that courts tend to rule in favor of tax agencies, then 
they may not initiate any AR proceeding at all:  the pursuit of dis-
pute resolution would be futile.  Therefore, (perceived) judicial bi-
as could indirectly reduce the volume of AR (and, mechanically, 
the volume of tax litigation).  However, this explanation implies 
that those who do end up initiating AR proceedings should be 
prepared to litigate, since the complainant is unlikely to acquire 
new information about the biases of courts in the AR proceeding 
itself.  But this is not the case.  While an estimated 14% of tax AR 
cases continue to litigation, a far higher proportion of complainants 
55  This computation is based on knowledge of the ratio of the total number 
of ARs brought against tax agencies to the total number of lawsuits brought 
against the same tax agencies; the information is available only for a part of Chi-
na’s tax bureaucracy and only for a few years.  The estimate is consistent with the 
result of a government study in 2007.  See Cui, supra note 19.  Note that this per-
centage itself is not too different from the U.S. Lederman, see supra note 15, at 329; 
infra note 62, (reporting IRS “settles approximately 90% of the cases it considers”). 
56 Currently no reliable statistic is independently available concerning the 
total number of AR proceedings against tax agencies.  The number must therefore 
be inferred.  If one assumes that 35% of litigated tax cases have gone through AR, 
and that these represent just 14% of all tax AR proceedings, then at 400 litigated 
cases a year, there are about 1,000 tax AR proceedings. 
57 Such a belief would be well justified, given that the rate of affirmation of 
agency actions during AR proceedings in general has consistently been greater 
than 50%.  See Xin He, Supra note 53, at 253.  No information is currently available 
regarding the breakdown of types of dispositions for tax AR proceedings specifi-
cally.  
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receive unfavorable determinations at the end of AR proceedings.58  
Such a high rate of attrition at the end of AR proceedings would be 
inexplicable if complainants made decisions to pursue AR after al-
ready having taken into account possible judicial bias.  
What else, then, might explain the low volume of tax AR pro-
ceedings?  Notably, when a taxpayer is required to apply for AR 
before bringing a lawsuit, e.g., in all disputes regarding deficiency 
assessments, it must also first remit the tax amount as determined 
by the tax authority, or provide corresponding guaranty, as a con-
dition for opening an AR proceeding.59  Such a requirement is not 
totally exceptional in comparative perspective,60 but it does seem to 
erect a barrier to the pursuit of a dispute.  It could do so in two 
ways.  First, if the tax paid is later ruled to be over–assessed, but no 
interest is paid on the over–collected amount, the payoff to litiga-
tion is reduced, since the tax refunded in the future is worth less 
now given the foregone interest.  This may induce settlement.61  
58 A 2007 government report claimed that complainants in tax AR proceed-
ings were able to obtain a favorable ruling or a settlement 62% of the time, which 
would be markedly higher than the outcome for AR proceedings in general.  See 
Lin Hong (蔺红), Guojia Shuiwu Zongju Fahui Fuyi Zhineng Cujin Zhengce Wanshan 
(国家税务总局发挥复议职能促进政策完善) [The State Administration of Taxation Used Adminis-
trative Reconsideration to Improve Tax Policymaking], ZHONGGUO SHUIWU BAO
(中国税务报) [CHINA TAXATION NEWS] (Feb. 5, 2007).  Yet even this high number im-
plies that 38% of complainants receive unfavorable rulings. 
59 See LATC, supra note 37, art. 88 (“If any tax dispute between the tax author-
ity and a taxpayer . . . occurs, the taxpayer . . . must first pay or remit taxes and the 
late fee . . ., or provide corresponding guaranty, and then may, apply for an ad-
ministrative reconsideration in accordance with the law.”).  In disputes where AR 
is not a precondition for seeking judicial remedies, such prior payment, e.g., the 
penalty, also is not required.  Id. 
60 The OECD reports a large number of countries authorizing the collection of 
disputed tax during both AR and judicial review although tax agencies in some 
countries may refrain from exercising such authority while a dispute is pending.  
ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), TAX 
ADMINISTRATION 2013: COMPARATIVE INFORMATION ON OECD AND OTHER
ADVANCED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES 324–25, T.9.11, 345–47 (2013), 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2313181e.pdf?expires=
1484662105&id=id&accname=ocid177112&checksum=F8E8273BB5EC385987454A
A13ED7D80C [https://perma.cc/Z84T-WKFS].  Some countries, including Japan 
and the UK, explicitly impose a requirement to pay assessed deficiencies before 
disputing an assessment in court.  Id. at 324–25, T.9.11.  Other countries require 
the provision of a guaranty for the tax amount disputed.  See Aurora Ribes, Spain, 
in COURTS AND TAX TREATY LAW 333, 336 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 3d ed. 2007) 
(footnote omitted) (“It should be emphasized that the claim form involves the 
temporary suspension of the administrative action provided that the taxpayer 
guarantees the tax sum, the interests and the correspondent recharges during the 
period of examination and decision of the case.”).  
61 Under current Chinese law, there is no clear provision requiring the gov-
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However, such an effect is significant only if the expected duration 
of litigation is long, the rate of foregone interest is high, or the 
amount in dispute is very large.62  Second and more significantly, it 
is possible that the defendant’s negotiation position generally 
changes after an AR is brought:  the government is easier to nego-
tiate with before a formal dispute is instigated, but toughens its po-
sition once a dispute is governed by formal legal procedures.63  
This may happen, for example, if the government’s negotiating po-
sition after entering into a formal dispute is based closely on law 
and estimates of the likelihood of prevailing during AR and litiga-
tion; whereas, before entering a formal dispute, it is influenced 
more by ongoing interactions with the taxpayer and considerations 
of revenue targets, or is more open to the discretion of particular 
revenue agents.  
This second possibility, however, implies that even if there is 
no requirement to pay tax before bringing an AR complaint against 
a tax agency, taxpayers may prefer to reach settlements instead of 
going into AR.  In other words, the incremental cost of paying tax 
first before pursuing formal dispute resolution may not exert a sig-
nificant independent effect.  In any case, existing AR statistics does 
not offer evidence that the requirement to pay tax as a precondition 
for AR induces more pre-AR settlement.64  If there is greater pre–
ernment to compensate for interest on tax refunded after AR or litigation. 
62 My review of the sample of published tax cases discussed in Part 4 indi-
cates that the average duration for a dispute to be decided by a first instance court 
is less than two years.  While the opportunity cost of funds for average taxpayers 
or the cost of financing (for cash constrained taxpayers) is a more complex matter, 
it should be noted that the interest cost of owing tax is also high:  Chinese tax law 
provides for an interest rate of over 18% per annum for overdue tax amounts.  See 
LATC, supra note 37, art. 32.  (“Where a taxpayer fails to pay taxes . . . within the 
prescribed time limit, the tax authority shall, . . . impose a late fee at the rate of 
0.05% per day of the amount of taxes in arrears, on the day the tax payment is 
overdue.”).  
63 One can imagine the tax agency’s position toughening once an AR pro-
ceeding opens and toughening even further once a lawsuit is launched. 
64 In the U.S. Tax Court, cases represent 95% of all first–instance tax cases 
brought to federal courts.  This has been explained by reference to the fact that, for 
a dispute with an IRS tax assessment to be accepted by the Federal Court of 
Claims or a District Court, the tax assessed must be paid first.  Thus, these latter 
courts only accept lawsuits for refunds of tax paid.  Leandra Lederman, What do 
Courts have to do with it? The Judiciary’s Role in Making Federal Tax Law, 65 NAT’L 
TAX J. 899, 900 (2012), http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1800&context=facpub [https://perma.cc/S9NH-FU8X]. 
However, there the observed effect of the requirement to pay tax before bringing a 
dispute is on the choice between alternative venues, not on whether to bring a 
dispute at all.  Moreover, other aspects of the Tax Court practice, such as the 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
964 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:3 
AR settlement in tax, it should follow that the rate of settlement 
during a tax AR proceeding should be lower than AR proceedings 
in general:  the tax cases that can be settled are more likely to have 
already been settled.  However, this appears not to be the case.  
Previous authors suggest that between 16% and 18% of all AR cas-
es continue to litigation.65  These percentages are actually higher, or 
at least not very different from, the estimated figure of 14% for the 
tax AR cases that continue to litigation.  Taxpayer complainants 
drop out of dispute resolution no less frequently than other com-
plainants.66 
In summary, while pre–litigation procedures for tax disputes 
are distinctive relative to other areas of disputes with Chinese gov-
ernment agencies, they do not seem to explain the low volume of 
tax litigation.  Moreover, the limited information available regard-
ing taxpayers’ use of these procedures seems to reject the relevance 
of judicial quality; the quality of the Chinese judiciary appears un-
likely to be a primary or even significant factor explaining ob-
served low case volume.67  
3.2.  Settlement during Litigation 
One might expect judicial quality to matter more once disputes 
availability of informal procedures and the commonality of pro se cases, may 
make the Tax Court a more attractive choice to most taxpayers.  See generally, id.  
Lederman also mentions the fact that IRS notices of deficiency only inform tax-
payers of the option to challenge the notice in the Tax Court, and not of other 
choices.  Id. at 900.  
65 See He, supra note 53, at 260, 263 (providing an estimate of 19% for 2009 
and citing an earlier study that estimated an average of 16–17%).  These percent-
ages still reflect a relatively high rate of attrition from dispute resolution, even af-
ter receiving unfavorable AR determinations.  Id. at 258. 
66 Moreover, limited information on settlement before a decision is issued at 
the end of an AR proceeding suggests that this type of settlement does not occur 
less frequently in tax than in other areas.  For a more detailed discussion, see Cui, 
supra note 19, at 142. 
67 However, pre–litigation procedures may well have effects on other ob-
served litigation patterns.  For example, the disputes not resolved during the AR 
process and subsequently brought to courts may settle less frequently during liti-
gation than cases that are directly brought to courts.  One can expect this substitu-
tive effect between earlier and later settlements because the disputes that are more 
amenable to settlement are likely to have been settled earlier.  The lower settle-
ment rates for lawsuits preceded by AR also implies that disputes preceded by AR 
may be over–represented in published court verdicts relative to its proportion in 
all lawsuits since only cases that are not settled receive judicial verdicts.  See infra 
note 109 and accompanying text. 
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are brought to courts.  However, it turns out that an important de-
terminant of plaintiff win rate in Chinese tax litigation is the rate of 
withdrawal from litigation before courts issue their decisions.  Us-
ing the same data as Chart 2, Chart 3 illustrates a negative correla-
tion between the rates of adjudication, which is basically the com-
plement of the rate of withdrawal, and the plaintiff win rates 
observed over sixteen years.  This correlation implies that in any 
given year the more disputes reached the stages where courts is-
sued decisions, i.e., the less often the plaintiffs settled with tax 
agencies or otherwise dropped their lawsuits, the less likely plain-
tiffs were to win in court.68 
 
 
 
 
This finding is important in several ways.  First, it implies that 
the cases that are decided by courts do not form a random and rep-
resentative sample of all disputes that are litigated.  If decided cas-
es were such a sample, the rate of plaintiff win should remain 
roughly the same regardless of what proportion of disputes is ad-
judicated, but this is clearly not the case.  Thus, as low as Chinese 
taxpayers’ chances of winning in court seem from decided cases (as 
indicated in Chart 2), their frequency of winning would be even 
lower if more cases were adjudicated.  Second, a statistically signif-
icant correlation between the rates of adjudication and plaintiff 
wins, when observed in the United States context, is generally tak-
68 More advanced statistical analysis confirms the significance of the correla-
tion observed in Chart 3.  See Cui & Wang, supra note 16, Table 2.  
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en by existing scholarship to be strong evidence for the “trial selec-
tion theory” of civil litigation.69  According to the trial selection 
theory, rational litigants go to trial when the difference in their ex-
pected values of the payoff from litigation is greater than the ag-
gregate cost of litigation for both parties.70  When the differences in 
expected value of litigation are smaller than the collective cost of 
litigation, the parties can achieve a mutually beneficial outcome by 
settling the dispute instead.  This rational choice model of litigant 
behavior also predicts that, all other things equal, plaintiffs are less 
likely to win where defendants:  (i) have greater stakes in litigation 
than plaintiffs, and/or (ii) have significant private information 
about the matter in dispute.71  In other words, insofar as the trial 
selection theory is applicable to a particular context,72 it tells us that 
litigation outcomes should be traced as much to the choices of liti-
gants as to the behavior of judges. 
Using a sophisticated analytical tool like the trial selection the-
ory indeed allows one to make a number of refined judgments 
about Chinese tax litigation patterns.  For example, a cross–agency 
comparison shows that the plaintiff win rate in tax disputes tends 
to be lower than the majority of other agencies.73  The trial selection 
theory typically explains such patterns by reference to several fac-
tors.  For example, different degrees of information asymmetry 
among litigants may be relevant.  Holding all else equal, any in-
formation advantage of the defendant is predicted by the selection 
theory to generate lower plaintiff win rates.  In comparing litiga-
tion outcomes against different Chinese government agencies, it 
can indeed be seen that in tax and certain other areas of regulation, 
69 For a recent review of this body of theory, see generally Hylton & Lin, supra 
note 9. 
70 Due to uncertainty and asymmetrical information, differences in expecta-
tions arise from different estimations of the probability of plaintiff prevailing. 
71 When both the stakes and information are symmetrical between the par-
ties, as legal uncertainty goes down and the cost of litigation goes up, the adjudi-
cation rate tends towards zero and the plaintiff win rate––famously––tends to-
wards 50%.  See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 9.  
72 The novelty of finding evidence for the trial selection theory in the Chinese 
context lies in the fact that very few legal scholars have so far explored whether 
that theory holds in civil law jurisdictions.  For further discussion, see Cui & 
Wang, supra note 16. 
73 Taxpayer plaintiffs seem to fare considerably better when suing certain 
other types of government entities, including township governments, land man-
agement bureaus, urban planning bureaus, and agricultural bureaus, although 
they tend to fare equally bad or even worse when suing family planning agencies 
and public health bureaus.  See Cui & Wang, supra note 16, at 16–17. 
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e.g. policing, public health, environmental protection, and family
planning, the plaintiff win rates are lower.  One explanation con-
sistent with the selection theory is that these agencies’ primary
roles are to enforce the law.  Thus, they may be much more famil-
iar with the details of the law to be enforced and how the law is
generally applied than the subjects of enforcement.  This amounts
to a form of information asymmetry between plaintiff and defend-
ants.  By contrast, a number of other agencies that lose more often
as defendants, such as land management and urban planning bu-
reaus, face plaintiffs that are real estate developers or who bring
class action suits.  These are precisely the types of plaintiffs who
suffer less from information disadvantages.
Another relevant factor is differences in statutory standards.  It 
is conceivable that the Chinese government has written the law in 
such a way as to give greater power to its most coercive branches, 
such as taxation, family planning, and public security.  In this case, 
holding all other things equal, plaintiffs should be less likely to 
win.  By contrast, it seems very unlikely that the distribution of 
power of the judiciary relative to different government depart-
ments can explain the variation in plaintiff win rates.  There is no 
reason to even have thought that family planning agencies are 
more powerful vis-à-vis the judiciary than township governments, 
or that public health officials are more powerful than those manag-
ing land use and issuing building permits.  Other factors, unrelated 
to judicial quality, must be at play. 
As with the discussion of factors that may explain the decline 
of the volume of tax litigation in Part 2, empirically establishing the 
factors affecting plaintiff win rates requires good data.  In Part 4, I 
will summarize the findings from a unique collection of tax dis-
putes that bear on these questions of information asymmetry and 
legal standards.  In addition, having noted that judicial quality is 
unlikely to explain variations in plaintiffs’ chances when litigating 
against different agencies, I will also examine whether there is evi-
dence for judicial bias in published tax case law. 
4. EVIDENCE FROM A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF CASE LAW
Parts 2 and 3 analyzed aggregate data on Chinese tax litigation.  
To evaluate the determinants of administrative litigation patterns, 
and specifically to assess how the quality of judicial institutions 
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may affect both litigation outcome and whether private parties de-
cide to bring suit in the first place, it is of course helpful to study 
the individual disputes themselves.  This Part discusses some find-
ings from analyses of the most comprehensive collection of judicial 
decisions resulting from tax litigation in China.74  
4.1.  The Sample 
Because China has a civil law system where most decided cases 
have no precedential value,75 for a long time there were no institu-
tional mechanisms or rationales for Chinese courts to publish their 
decisions systematically.  Consequently, the publication of judicial 
decisions on administrative lawsuits was both highly haphazard 
and highly selective.76  However, case publication practices of Chi-
nese courts went through a radical transformation in recent years. 
In 2009, China’s Supreme People’s Court urged all courts to pro-
mote judicial transparency by placing cases online.77  Simultane-
ously with this announcement (and in some places even before), 
several jurisdictions, including the province of Henan and the City 
of Shanghai, began to release a large amount of judicial verdicts on 
the Internet.78  At the end of 2013, the SPC launched its own web-
74 For a detailed exposition, see Cui, supra note 19. 
75 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 2015), Chapter 6.  
76 Some decisions were published in textbooks for judge training, or other-
wise as results of one–time efforts by judges, scholars, or others interested in ad-
ministrative litigation to depict judicial practice.  The cases that became publicly 
accessible in this manner were probably unrepresentative due to editor bias. 
77 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the Six Provisions on Ju-
dicial Openness and Several Provisions on the People’s Courts’ Exposure to Pub-
lic Supervision through Mass Media (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 8, 2009) 
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yingfa Guanyu Sifa Gongkai de Liuxiang Guiding he 
Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Jieshou Xinwen Meiti Yulun Jiandu De Ruogan Guiding 
de Tongzhi (最高人民法院印发《关于司法公开的六项规定》和《关于人民法院接受新闻媒体舆论监督
的若干规定》的通知) (“The trial management work and other management activities 
related to the trial work of the people’s court shall be disclosed to the public.  The 
people’s court at all levels shall gradually establish and improve the websites and 
other information disclosure platforms.”).  
78 For a discussion of such initiatives in Henan, see Benjamin L. Liebman, Le-
niency in Chinese Criminal Law? Everyday Justice in Henan, 33 Berkeley J. Int'l Law. 
153 (2015) at 158–65.  By early 2014, more than 600,000 cases were posted online in 
Henan.  Id. at 160.  For a discussion of similar initiatives in Shanghai, see He & Su, 
supra note 12, at 126.  More than 100,000 decisions were made available in Shang-
hai by 2009.  Note, that these numbers pertain to all varieties of judicial verdicts 
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site publishing judicial decisions rendered by courts across China,79 
while issuing guidelines regarding what types of decisions should 
be made public.80  Since then, an extraordinary amount of judicial 
decisions have become accessible.  Although restrictions are placed 
on the publication of several categories of decisions, administrative 
litigation is not one of them.81  Existing examinations of recent 
court case publication practices suggest that the scope of publica-
tion in non-restricted areas is reasonably comprehensive.82    
The sample of tax cases discussed below was made possible by 
this recent change in publication practice.83  The sample includes 
233 original or edited court documents published between 1987 
and 2012, some of which combine first–instance and second–
instance, i.e., regular appeals, decisions.  Because Chinese appellate 
decisions tend to excerpt first–instance decisions extensively, close 
to 400 court judgments are reflected in the sample.84  The number 
of verdicts per year in the sample increased over time—not, we 
know, because the volume of tax litigation increased,85 but only be-
cause of better publication practice of courts.  Similarly, the geo-
graphical distribution of the sample is uneven.86  The sample thus 
allowed to be published and not just administrative litigation. 
79 See ZHONGGUO CAIPAN WENSHU WANG (中国裁判文书网) [JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF
CHINA], http://www.court.gov.cn/zgcpwsw/.  
80 See Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Issuance of Judgments 
on the Internet by the People’s Courts, art. 2 (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 
11, 2013) Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zai Hulianwang 
Gongbu Caipan Wenshu de Guiding (最高人民法院关于人民法院在互联网公布裁判文书的规定), 
ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网) (“The Supreme People’s Court will set up a 
website for Judicial Opinions of China on the Internet, and uniformly issue the 
effective judgments on the people’s courts at all levels.”).  
81 See Liebman, supra note 78, at 156 (“Certain cases, most notably death sen-
tences, remain unavailable and we know little about those that are not made pub-
lic.  Nevertheless… there is much to learn from publicly available cases...”).  
82 See id, at 163–64; He & Su, supra note 12, at 128. 
83 However, case gathering ended in May 2013.  Thus, the sample does not 
include tax cases that have become public after that time. 
84 The 233 documents collected map onto 190 lawsuits, with the latter indi-
viduated by reference to whether the same set of parties and facts were involved.  
For several factors we examine in coding the cases, it is not the number of deci-
sions, but the number of lawsuits, that is relevant. 
85 See supra Part 2, Chart 1 (indicating overall decrease in Chinese tax litiga-
tion from 1998 to 2013).  
86 The city of Shanghai and the province of Henan contribute almost half of 
the documents, while all but three of the other twenty-eight provinces each con-
tributed fewer than ten.  However, the predominance of Henan and Shanghai cas-
es in the sample holds only for the years 2009–2011 and waned by 2012.  It is also 
worth noting that there is presently no information about the geographical distri-
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shares the geographical bias displayed by other recent scholarly at-
tempts to analyze large quantities of Chinese case law.87  On the 
other hand, for 2010, the decisions included in the sample comprise 
over 20% of all tax decisions rendered in China in that year.  This 
relatively high rate of publication—remarkable for a civil law 
country where published decisions do not yet fulfill any legal func-
tion—was also observed in 2011 and 2012.88  
Existing content analyses of Chinese judicial opinions have 
drawn on samples from particular courts and particular years.89  
More problematically, studies of administrative litigation in par-
ticular have used samples that are truly small.90  While geograph-
ical bias is still present in the sample of tax cases used here, I tried 
to expand the sample’s coverage both geographically and over 
time.  The longer time horizon of the sample especially permits the 
discovery of litigation patterns that take years to unfold.91  Finally, 
given the discussion in Part 3, it is known that, even if all or most 
court judgments are published, they are likely to be unrepresenta-
tive of all disputes brought to courts because many lawsuits settle 
before they result in judicial verdicts.  Therefore, in interpreting the 
findings from the sample, I strive to take the biases that are pre-
                                                                                                              
bution of tax litigation across China, so how unrepresentative the sample is in this 
regard remains unknown.  
87  For a discussion of shared geographic bias in large Chinese analyses, see 
Liebman, supra note 78; He & Su, supra note 12.  
88  For statistical data pertaining to 2011 and 2012, see Cui, supra note 19, at 
144–45.  By contrast, published decisions collected for earlier years represented 
between only 0.6% and 2.7% of rendered decisions.  Thus, in 2000, which wit-
nessed the largest number of concluded tax cases––2025 decisions––only seven-
teen decisions were found.  
89  See, e.g., He & Su, supra note 12 (reporting published decisions in Shanghai 
courts from 2004 to 2009); Liebman, supra note 78 (examining published Henan 
criminal cases in 2013 from two courts).  
90  See, e.g., Li, supra note 12, at 79 (41 decisions corresponding to 19 tax dis-
putes in one province between 2009 and 2011); Xuehua Zhang & Leonard Orto-
lano, Judicial Review of Environmental Administrative Decisions: Has it Changed the 
Behavior of Government Agencies? 64 CHINA J. 97, 102 (2010) (14 cases from two 
counties). 
91  For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 130–133 infra.  In the 
sample, the most common types of actions of tax agencies challenged in courts are 
assessments of deficiencies, penalties, and compulsory measures in collection or 
tax preservation.  But, challenges against a wide variety of other agency actions, 
such as state compensation, denial of administrative reconsideration, government 
inaction, e.g., failure to reward whistleblowers, and government information dis-
closures are also included. 
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dicted by trial selection theory into account.92 
4.2.  The Findings 
 Judges have no reason to reveal any lack of independence in 
their written decisions.  Conversely, even if judicial verdicts fre-
quently end up in favor of government defendants, this may simp-
ly be the result of the facts of the cases and applicable law, and not 
of judicial attitudes.  Therefore, evidence from published cases on 
whether judicial attitudes or judicial quality determine outcomes 
can only be indirect. In the following, I discuss four groups of rele-
vant evidence.  First, a previous study claimed that because Chi-
nese courts can be assumed to lack independence in tax adjudica-
tion and because potential plaintiffs fear retaliation from tax 
agencies, actually observed cases of tax litigation tend to involve 
exceptional circumstances.  The prevalence of such exceptional cir-
cumstances could thus constitute indirect evidence for judicial bias.  
Therefore, I examine the frequency of such circumstances. Second, 
the trial selection theory discussed earlier suggests that litigants’ 
rational choices with respect to settlement can mask judicial atti-
tudes.  Therefore, I consider the strength of selection effects in the 
sample, focusing on determinants of plaintiff wins.  Third, findings 
relating to whether there exists information asymmetry between 
plaintiffs and defendants in tax litigation are discussed.  Fourth 
and finally, I discuss what residual evidence there is both for the 
location of legal standards in tax disputes, and for the relationship 
between the judiciary and tax administration.  
92  I calibrate the sample in several ways.  First, one recent empirical study of 
Chinese administrative litigation is based on a large sample of cases––not restrict-
ed to tax––directly gathered from courts, including withdrawn cases and un-
published cases.  See Huang, supra note 52.  It is, thus, free from publication bias, 
and I make use of relevant results from that study.  Second, I find the proportion 
of two main types of defendants in tax litigation––state tax bureaus and local tax 
bureaus––to be roughly consistent between our sample and what is known about 
the underlying dispute population.  Third, the types of taxes involved in the sam-
ple disputes are also consistent with the tax structure in China.  For details, see 
Cui, supra note 19. 
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4.2.1.  Does Tax Litigation Involve Aberrant Behavior? 
In a previous study of tax litigation in China, Professor Ji Li as-
serted that it is common knowledge that Chinese courts would 
generally favor defendants in tax disputes, and that anyone suing 
tax collectors would likely face “retaliation”93  Therefore, he ar-
gues, it is hardly surprising that few Chinese taxpayers “dare sue” 
the tax collector; what is surprising is why anyone would sue.94  
Professor Li postulates several reasons.  One is that some plaintiffs 
are “retaliation-proof”: the defendant may have limited jurisdic-
tion over the plaintiff and therefore cannot effectively retaliate; or 
the plaintiff literally has “nothing to lose” (the favored example is 
tax whistleblowers who are unemployed social gadflies).95  Anoth-
er is that the plaintiff is politically well-connected, which forces the 
adjudicating court to act neutrally.96  Yet a third reason is that 
“high stakes” are involved and other channels of conflict resolution 
are closed.97  Professor Li’s argument appears to be that unless one 
of these factors is present, litigating against Chinese tax collectors 
would be “irrational.”98  
I investigated these claims in several ways. The first is the mone-
tary amount in dispute.  In half of the cases in our sample, the 
amounts of tax payment in dispute (not including penalties) are 
given.  The smallest such amount is 30 Chinese Yuan (CNY)—
approximately 5 US dollars, while the largest amount is 12,806,105 
CNY.  The mean amount disputed is 1,314,541 CNY and median 
138,976 CNY.  The following two charts illustrate the distribution 
of disputed amounts.  The first chart, covering the entire sample, 
shows that the top two deciles of cases involve disputes over RMB 
2 million or more, which are substantial amounts by any stand-
ards.  The second chart shows that within the bottom half of distri-
bution of cases in terms of amount, there is still a significant 
93 Li, supra note 12, at 69. 
94 Id. at 72.  
95 Id. at 80-6 (discussing the role of professional whistleblowers within Chi-
nese tax litigation). 
96 Id. at 99–103. Professor Li simply assumes that otherwise courts need not 
be neutral. 
97 Id. at 86–103. It is not clear why this explanation of the occurrence of many 
lawsuits would not apply generally to all legal systems, and why it explains the 
special pattern of litigation in China.     
98 Id. at 75.  Professor Li claims to find at least one such factor in each of the 
19 cases he studies. 
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spread, and once the third decile is passed, the disputes amounts 
are already above RMB 20,000.  Thus, at least judging by the pub-
lished decisions, many Chinese taxpayers sue tax agencies because 
non-trivial sums are at stake, and not because of antagonisms unre-
lated to the economic value of a dispute.99  The distribution of 
amount disputed is also continuous up to the top decile, with no 
evidence of disputes bunching at the low end (due to those plain-
tiffs who “have nothing to lose”) and at the high end (due to those 
plaintiffs with “high stakes”).  
 
99  The preponderance of disputes involving small amounts at the bottom 
half of the distribution is also consistent with experiences in other countries.  See, 
e.g., DUBROFF & HELLWIG, supra note 27, at 5034, (reporting that “small cases” con-
sistently represented around 50% of all cases in the U.S. Tax Court in recent
years).  Small tax cases in the U.S. tax court are cases involving less than $50,000 a
year. See also Lederman, supra note 64, at 901.  In Canada, more than half of Tax
Court cases were brought using the informal procedure, which is available only
when the amount of federal tax and penalties in dispute is $25,000 or less. See also
Alarie & Green, supra note 15, at 995–96.
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Thus the majority of the cases do not involve plaintiffs “with 
low incomes and revenues [who] are relatively immune to the 
agencies' retaliation threats.”100  In theory, cases with larger 
amounts in dispute may be more likely to go to trial,101 and thus 
the sample of published cases may not be representative of the un-
derlying population.102  Therefore I also specifically reviewed for 
evidence that the plaintiff has low income or low levels of wealth, 
and found this to be the case only in 5 out of 190 cases.  
I also tested Professor Li’s claim that potential plaintiffs in Chi-
na would not sue the agencies that routinely regulate them, for fear 
of retaliation, and therefore that many actual lawsuits involve tax-
payers and tax agencies that dealt on a one-time basis.  I specifical-
ly attempted to determine whether the defendant in a case has 
regular jurisdiction over the plaintiff taxpayer.  In the 135 cases in 
which it is possible to make this determination, the defendant is 
the regular tax administrator over the plaintiff in 100 cases.  Thus, 
it is overwhelmingly disputes involving locals that are adjudicated.  
100  Li, supra note 12, at 75.  Such plaintiffs presumably would not be suing for 
such large amounts. 
101  In the model of Priest and Klein, supra note 9 (taking trial and settlement 
costs as constant, the larger the amount in dispute, the more likely that a given 
difference in the estimated probability of outcomes by the plaintiff and defendant 
will result in a sufficiently large divergence in the expected values of judgments).  
102 Note that Professor Li also drew his evidence from a small number of 
published cases.  
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The idea that only the “out-of-towner” sues the tax collector (along 
with local social misfits) finds no support in the sample.  This ap-
pears to be a robust result since parties that deal on a routine basis 
should have more incentives to stay out of court or to settle during 
litigation.  Therefore the various stages of trial selection—for the 
commencement of a lawsuit and for getting to a verdict—should 
screen out many disputes among locals and ensure that they are 
under-represented, instead of over-represented, in decided cases.  
Finally, close to 60% of the cases in the sample studied involve 
individual plaintiffs.  This percentage likely understates the pro-
portion of individuals bringing suit, since individuals are more 
likely to withdraw a lawsuit (i.e. settle with the defendant) than 
other types of plaintiffs.103  Among the plaintiffs that are entities, 
72% are non-state-owned, private firms.  While some individual 
and private firm plaintiffs may be politically well-connected,104 
claiming that plaintiffs would not sue tax collectors but for being 
politically well-connected seems far-fetched.  Overall, political 
connections and plaintiff “retaliation-proofness” offer at best mar-
ginal explanations of why tax litigation happens in China. 
4.2.2.  Evidence of Selection Effects 
According to trial selection theory, rational litigants will take 
any information regarding judicial bias into account when decid-
ing whether to go to trial.  If both the plaintiff and the defendant 
expect the deciding judge to be biased against the plaintiff, they 
103  See Huang, supra note 52, at 81.  In Huang’s sample (which covers 2,767 
administrative litigation cases, though only 28 of which were tax litigation) 79.5% 
of plaintiffs were individuals.  See id, at 77.  The under-representation of individu-
als in published decisions was also a feature of the case sample analyzed in Pei, 
supra note 11. 
104 Some studies have suggested that politically well-connected Chinese 
firms are more likely to go to court in general (not just for purposes of suing gov-
ernment agencies).  See Yuen Yuen Ang & Nan Jia, Perverse Complementarity: Politi-
cal Connections and the Use of Courts among Chinese Private Firms, 76 J. POL. 318 
(2014) (examining the ways in which political connections promote or undermine 
the use of formal legal institutions).  Note, however, that this may be little differ-
ent from patterns observed in other countries. See B. Zorina Khan, “To Have and 
Have Not”: Are Rich Litigious Plaintiffs Favored in Court? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 20945, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20945 
[https://perma.cc/42M6-NYP8] (studying civil litigation in Maine from the Colo-
nial period through to the Civil War, and showing that wealthier individuals en-
gaged in litigation more). 
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will settle instead of going to trial (thus saving the cost of litiga-
tion).  Consequently, the judge’s bias may not end up being reflect-
ed in decided cases; any judicial bias can be observed in published 
decisions only where such filtering through litigants’ choices fails 
to be effective.105  Although, for reasons discussed below,106 it is 
presently not possible to implement any quantitative measure of 
judicial bias for Chinese administrative litigation, it makes sense to 
consider whether the selection effect of litigant choices is strong 
enough in tax litigation that any such bias would be masked any-
way.107 
I find some evidence for the selection effect in the case sample.  
As argued in Part 3.1. supra, lawsuits preceded by administrative 
appeal (AR) are less likely to settle during litigation.  This implies 
that disputes preceded by AR may be over-represented in pub-
lished court verdicts relative to its proportion in all lawsuits (only 
cases that are not settled receive judicial verdicts).  This prediction 
is confirmed by the sample: in 50% of the cases, the disputes either 
went through or an application for AR was rejected by a reviewing 
agency.  This is significantly higher than the figure reported in a 
study based on a more representative sample of published and un-
published disputes, where only 36% of tax disputes were reported 
to be preceded by AR.108  
Another kind of evidence seems to confirm the selection effect 
of AR. Our sample captures 254 first-instance judicial decisions.109  
Among these, the plaintiff win rate is 18.4%.110  This is somewhat 
higher than the average rate of plaintiff wins in Chinese tax litiga-
105  See John M. de Figueiredo, Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Tele-
communications Litigation, 21 J. LAW ECON. ORG. 501 (2005) (studying the effect of 
judicial ideology on the selection and outcome of telecommunications regulatory 
cases). 
106 See text accompanying notes 122–127 infra. 
107 The evidence presented in Part 3.2.  for the trial selection theory is based 
on aggregate data and on diachronic variations.  Here I consider whether this ef-
fect is manifest in sample cases themselves. 
108 Huang, supra note 52, at 80. 
109 Because many decisions on appeal report the decisions of the first-
instance courts, it is possible to code for some aspects of such first-instance deci-
sions even though they are not directly available.  Thus 272 first-instance disposi-
tions are captured in the sample, including 49 summary dismissals and 18 permis-
sions to withdraw.  Consistently with the calculation described in Part 2, 
summary dismissals are included as a kind of judicial verdict (thus in the denom-
inator for computing plaintiff wins) but permissions to withdraw are not. 
110  119 decisions in our sample were rendered by courts on appeals.  Among 
these, the plaintiff win rate was 20%. 
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tion over recent years.111  In disputes involving penalties, however, 
the plaintiff win rate is even higher. 57 out of 190 lawsuits in the 
sample implicated penalties.  First instance courts reversed the 
penalties in 21 cases (sustaining in part and reversing in part in 4 
more.)  This is a significantly higher win rate for plaintiffs than on 
average, and it may not be coincidental: as discussed in Section 
3.1., penalty decisions can be appealed to courts directly without 
going through AR; thus, the filtering effect of AR—which sup-
presses observed plaintiff win rates—does not apply.112  
4.2.3.  Evidence for Information Asymmetry between Plaintiffs and 
Defendants 
An interesting set of results from the analysis of published cas-
es relates to information asymmetry between plaintiffs and de-
fendants.  Under the trial selection theory, if the defendant enjoys 
an information advantage regarding issues relevant to trial out-
come—e.g. it possesses private information about the facts impli-
cated in the disputes such as whether the defendant was negligent, 
greater knowledge about judicial attitudes, and so on—it will make 
more informed decisions about settlement, adopt more effective 
strategies when bargaining with plaintiffs, etc., all of which will re-
sult in a lower observed plaintiff win rate. In tax and other admin-
istrative litigation, it is possible that the defendants systematically 
enjoy information advantages.  In particular, tax agencies may 
have good knowledge of the law regardless of whether they have 
attorney representation, since enforcing the law is their job.  By 
111  See Chart 2 supra. 
112  The importance of the trial selection theory is illustrated by this last dis-
cussion.  Without applying such a theory, one might be tempted to explain why 
Chinese courts are more willing to hold against tax agencies in penalty cases than 
in other cases, in terms of judicial attitudes or judicial quality.  For example, per-
haps penalty cases more often involve intuitive judgments about fairness (i.e. 
“Was the penalty commensurate with the taxpayer’s fault?”).  And judges are 
perhaps less willing to defer to tax agencies in respect of such judgments than in 
respect of more “technical” judgments about the proper tax treatment of various 
transactions.  Moreover, since the impositions of penalties tend to be subject to 
more stringent administrative procedures, judges may seem especially well posi-
tioned to safeguard procedural (as opposed to substantive) justice.  However, 
such hypotheses about the effect of judicial quality on litigation outcome may well 
be spurious, given the existence of another theory that simultaneously explains a 
much wider range of phenomena. 
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contrast, taxpayer plaintiffs (especially those that have been as-
sessed deficiencies) are likely to be adequately informed about the 
law only when they engage attorneys.  This hypothesis is partially 
supported in the U.S. context, where it has been found that attor-
ney representation of taxpayers in Tax Court proceedings signifi-
cantly reduced the IRS recovery rate.113  
In the 233 judicial documents I analyzed, plaintiffs are repre-
sented by attorneys in 113 instances, and act pro se in the remaining 
120 cases.114  Two different statistical tools (crosstab and multivari-
ate logit regression) show that plaintiff attorney representation is 
significantly (at the .001 level) and negatively correlated with 
whether the plaintiff is an individual, and significantly (at the .05 
level) and positively correlated with whether the case was preced-
ed by AR.115  In other words, individual plaintiffs, as well as plain-
tiffs who have brought suit directly instead of going through AR, 
are less likely to hire attorneys.116  Interestingly, plaintiff represen-
tation significantly (at the .05 level) increased the chance that the 
plaintiff will make a procedural argument in the case.117  There is 
some evidence, therefore, that hiring attorneys helps mitigate 
plaintiffs’ information disadvantage, and the greater than half of 
plaintiffs who failed to hire attorneys did so to their own detri-
ment. 
Defendants’ representation by lawyers turns out to be an en-
tirely different story.  In the sample, tax agencies hired attorneys 
more frequently than plaintiffs—in 131 of the cases.  However, 
whether a defendant engaged attorneys shows no significant corre-
113  See Lederman & Hrung, supra note 15, at 1255 (referencing statistical find-
ings of the IRS’s recovery ratio when a taxpayer has an attorney). 
114 It is conceivable that cases with plaintiff attorney representation involve 
more elaborate fact finding and legal interpretation, and that courts are more like-
ly to publish elaborate cases.  In combination, these factors suggest that the pro-
portion of plaintiff attorney representation may be over-stated in published cases. 
115  In the multivariate analysis, I used two additional independent variables 
as controls: whether the dispute took place in an urban (as opposed to rural) area, 
and the monetary amount disputed.  Neither of these variables turned out to have 
any significant correlation with either plaintiff or defendant attorney representa-
tion.  The independent variables also bear no significant correlations with one an-
other, dispelling concerns about multi-collinearity in the multivariate regressions. 
116  This is consistent with the pattern in the descriptive statistics in Huang, 
supra note 52: entity plaintiffs are much more likely to engage attorneys than indi-
vidual plaintiffs. 
117  Plaintiff representation is also positively correlated with the outcome of 
an adverse ruling against the defendant using a simple crosstab measure, alt-
hough this effect disappears using the more rigorous multivariate logit analysis. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss3/4
2017] DOES JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE MATTER? 979 
lation with whether the lawsuit was preceded by AR or with other 
independent variables (e.g. the location or amount in dispute).  
Moreover, defendant representation by lawyers has no significant 
impact on the likelihood of the defendant mounting a procedural 
defense.  Finally, defendant attorney representation even seems 
positively correlated (under crosstab) with an adverse ruling 
against the government—the government’s decision of hiring a 
lawyer is more likely to lead to a government loss—although a 
more rigorous multivariate analysis shows that it simply has no ef-
fect on case outcome.  Whether external attorneys offer any “value 
added” to tax agency defendants, therefore, is quite unclear. 
These patterns can be interpreted as evidence that tax agencies 
are themselves aware of the relevant procedural rules even without 
external legal support.  In another recent empirical study of Chi-
nese administrative litigation, the average frequency of attorney 
representation of defendants across agencies was 30%.118  This is 
much lower than the frequency (57%) of defendant attorney repre-
sentation in our tax sample.  The author of that study, Professor 
Huang Qihui, argued that because government agencies both have 
in-house lawyers and are repeat-players in litigation, they are less 
likely to hire attorneys than plaintiffs.  In other words, external 
lawyers may not provide enough “value added” for government 
defendants.  This view is consistent with the observed effect of de-
fendant attorney representation in our sample.  It could also ex-
plain why tax agencies’ choice about whether to have attorney rep-
resentation seems more random than that of plaintiffs.119  
4.2.4.  Legal Standards and Judicial Bias 
Notwithstanding the selection effects of both pre-litigation pro-
ceedings and settlements during litigation, and notwithstanding 
the general brevity of Chinese court decisions,120 it is possible to 
118 Huang, supra note 52, at 78. 
119  If external attorneys provide relatively little value added, there should 
also be little selection bias that would result in defendant attorney engagement 
being over-represented in case samples.  This raises the possibility that tax agen-
cies in fact engage lawyers in litigation more often than other agencies, despite (or 
perhaps because of) the low volume of tax litigation. 
120  The average length of decisions in the sample is fewer than 3,000 Chinese 
characters (the equivalent, if translated, is not much more than 2,000 English 
words).  
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glean evidence from the large sample of tax cases regarding the le-
gal standards applicable to disputes between taxpayers and tax 
administrators, the judicial application of these standards, and 
even the reactions of the executive branch of government towards 
tax litigation.   
At the outset, however, it is worth noting that the method for 
empirically studying judicial bias most commonly employed in 
U.S. scholarship is not feasible in China.121  In empirical tests of the 
“attitudinal model” of judicial behavior—particularly to test the 
hypothesis that the decisions of judges can be predicted from their 
political party affiliation or ideology—scholars usually examine the 
decisions of a small number of judges in a large number of cases.122  
In this approach, the large quantity of decisions associated with 
each judge dilutes the effect on case outcome of the merits of par-
ticular cases.  The relatively small number of judges involved, 
meanwhile, makes it feasible to gather personal information about 
each of them.  The theoretical validity of this approach to testing 
the attitudinal model is controversial.123  But even if it is valid 
(when properly used), it would be difficult to implement in China. 
Chinese judges’ role in most types of adjudication is much less in-
dividualistic than in the U.S.; the role of individual courts is much 
more prominent.124  Moreover, even if relevant, the personal char-
acteristics of judges in the thousands of lower-level courts that ad-
judicate almost all of the first- and second-instance lawsuits are dif-
ficult to gather. 125  Finally, in almost all areas of administrative 
litigation—tax is only one extreme example in this regard—the 
case volume is sufficiently low, and case publication practice suffi-
ciently recent, that not many cases can be attributed to the same 
121  Indeed, such method may not be deployable in most countries with civil 
law judiciaries and less individualistic judges. 
122 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (studying the use of the attitudinal model to 
predict Supreme Court decision-making); see also CROSS, supra note 2.  
123  There is a particularly acute question of whether it can be reconciled with 
the trial selection theory. See de Figueiredo, supra note 105.  
124  See generally, Liebman, supra note 78. 
125 In J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003), Professors 
Ramseyer and Rasmusen studied the Japanese judiciary, which is much smaller 
and more elite in composition than China’s corps of over 200,000 court employees.  
They provided evidence that Japanese judges could decide cases independently in 
tax and other subject matter areas, by using data about the judges’ promotions, 
demotions, and career stagnations.  Such data is not available in China and thus 
this approach for studying judicial independence is also not feasible. 
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court.  For example, in 2013, when all administrative lawsuits are 
combined, there are, on average, fewer than 40 cases for each of the 
over 3,000 Chinese basic-level courts, and there is approximately 
one tax case for every nine such courts.126   
The evidence we have, therefore, is circumstantial.  Two types 
of weak evidence for judicial bias in favor of the government can 
be reported.  First, in many cases in the sample, judges displayed 
strong deference to tax agencies on matters of legal interpretation, 
to the detriment of plaintiffs.  This is especially apparent in a sub-
stantial number of decisions (69 of them) where the agency actions 
challenged were partially based on informal agency guidance.  Ac-
cording to the SPC’s position, such guidance lacks the formal force 
of law and is not binding on courts.127  In a number of these cases, 
plaintiffs requested the courts disregard allegedly inappropriate 
informal guidance, and the courts declined to do so even though 
they had the power to.  However, it must be recognized that judi-
cial deference to administrative agencies in statutory interpretation 
is widespread even in mature legal systems, and can clearly be 
compatible with judicial independence.128  Moreover, the more 
statutes (or law with equivalent force) delegate authority to admin-
istrative agencies to engage in rulemaking and legal interpretation, 
the harder it will be for courts to contravene the exercise of such 
delegated power.  Thus it is not clear that the prevalence of judicial 
deference in tax cases should be blamed on judicial weakness as 
opposed to excessive statutory delegation.129 
A second weak indication of judicial bias is the courts’ response 
to procedural arguments.  In seventy-seven decisions in the sam-
ple, plaintiffs raised procedural challenges against agency actions, 
126  The decisions of 133 different courts in China are represented in the case 
sample studied here.  Even courts that published the largest number of tax cases 
in the sample (two intermediate courts in Shanghai) only had 9 and 8 cases each.  
127 The legal status of informal agency guidance and the SPC’s position with 
respect to such guidance is extensively discussed in Nicolas C. Howson, Enforce-
ment Without Foundation? Insider Trading and China's Administrative Law Crisis, 60 
AM. J. COMP. L. 955 (2012), and Wei Cui, What is the “Law” in Chinese Tax Admin-
istration? 19 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 73 (2011). 
128 See KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, CHAPTER 6 (2D ED. 2014); see also Kristin E. Hickman, 
IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
239 (2009) (discussing issues of administrative law raised by the IRS’ informal pol-
icy guidance). 
129 On excess statutory delegation in Chinese tax law, see Cui, supra note 127. 
Note also that, in our case sample, there were at least 30 instances where courts 
ruled that tax agencies misapplied the law. 
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but this led to adverse rulings against agencies only in thirteen in-
stances.  Defendants made defenses on procedural grounds also in 
a significant number of cases, which resulted in favorable rulings 
for the defendants in two thirds of the cases (forty-three out of six-
ty-six).  However, in seven decisions, courts spontaneously (i.e. 
without the plaintiffs raising relevant challenges) made adverse 
rulings against agencies on procedural grounds.  Without studying 
the merits of all these procedural claims (which often require 
knowledge of facts not sufficiently disclosed in the decisions), the 
evidence is not conclusive.  
On the other hand, the sample also contains cases that reflect 
the executive branch’s view of judicial independence.  Of particu-
lar interest are clusters of cases where a specific type of disputes is 
repeatedly brought to courts over time, and where the government 
appears to have changed the law in reaction to litigation.  An im-
portant advantage of longitudinal coverage of the case sample as-
sembled here is that it allows one to observe such shifts in legal 
standards.  
One such cluster of cases relates to the treatment of innocent 
third parties in detected VAT fraud.  A prevalent type of VAT 
fraud in China is the sham issuance of VAT invoices.130  Although 
both criminal and civil penalties apply to those who issue sham in-
voices, beginning in 1995 the Chinese tax authority applied an ad-
verse rule against buyers who receive such invoices: any invoice 
that is the product of a sham issuance cannot be used to claim in-
put credits by buyers, regardless of whether the buyer is aware of 
the sham issuance.131  That is, even innocent buyers, who receive 
VAT invoices from purported sellers who signed real contracts 
with the buyers, delivered the specified goods, and provided in-
voices that correspond perfectly with the transactions from the 
130  For purposes other than criminal law, a sham issuance encompasses issu-
ing, for oneself or for others, or allowing others to issue for oneself, invoices that 
are “inconsistent with actual business affairs.”  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Fapiao Guanli Banfa (《中华人民共和国发票管理办法》) [Invoice Management Measures 
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 20, 
2010, effective Feb. 1, 2011), Order No. 587.  A sham issuance is distinguished 
from producing forged VAT invoices—the invoice issued is authentic, it just does 
not correspond to actual transactions.  This area of substantive Chinese tax law is 
discussed in ALAN SCHENK ET AL, VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
467–73 (2015) (Chapter 14, Section VI.C). 
131  This is a punitive outcome for taxpayers even if no explicit penalty is im-
posed: they would need to bear a sizeable tax burden that normally would be 
passed on to downstream producers or consumers. 
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buyers’ perspectives, are denied input credit if the invoices turn 
out to be issued in a sham.132  This controversial “buyer strict liabil-
ity” regime gave rise to repeated disputes between taxpayers and 
tax authorities, some of which went into litigation.  In our sample, 
four cases, litigated at different times and in different parts of Chi-
na, presented such fact patterns.  In all three cases tried before 
2009, the plaintiffs (all innocent buyers) argued (correctly) that the 
tax authority’s rules lacked basis in the law.  In all three lawsuits, 
courts in the first instance and on appeal held for the government 
and found ways to deflect plaintiff arguments about the legal in-
firmities of the tax agencies’ policies.  One could interpret this ei-
ther as a sign of the lack of judicial independence, or as a normal 
example of judicial deference to the executive branch.  But more in-
terestingly, the national government, when it revised the relevant 
VAT regulations in 2008, deliberately changed the legal standard.  
Whereas the old VAT regulation did not provide support for the 
informal policy of tax agencies regarding sham issuances, the new 
regulation endorsed the effectiveness of such informal policy, mak-
ing it much harder for a taxpayer to challenge it.  Not coincidently, 
in the fourth case in our sample, the plaintiff was not able to ad-
vance this legal argument.133  
There are other clusters of cases in our sample that illustrate the 
same pattern:  the government was challenged in court on the basis 
of the legal infirmities of some of its policies (and occasionally suf-
fered legal defeat); subsequently the law was amended in the gov-
ernment’s favor to fix the previous infirmity.  For instance, certain 
132 This could happen where, for example, unknowingly to the buyer, the 
purported seller was not the owner of the goods sold and was simply acting on 
behalf of someone else (who is not able to issue VAT invoices). 
133 This legal issue continues to be litigated and new cases have emerged not 
contained in the original sample.  See Anhui Sheng Hefei Shi Luyang Qu Renmin 
Fayuan Xingzheng Panjue Shu (安徽省合肥市庐阳区人民法院行政判决书) [Anhui Province 
Hefei City Luyang District People’s Court Administrative Litigation Decision]; see 
also Lu Xing Chuzi Di 00032 Hao (庐行初字第00032号) [Lu Administrative Trial De-
cision No.00032] (2014); see also Jinhu Shengjin Tongye Youxian Gongsi yu Huaian 
Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Jicha Ju Xingzheng Chufa Ershen Xingzheng Panjue Shu (金
湖盛锦铜业有限公司与淮安市国家税务局稽查局行政处罚二审行政判决书) [Jinhu Shengjin Cop-
per Company Ltd. v. Huaian City State Taxation Bureau Tax Inspection Depart-
ment Administrative Penalty Second Instance Administrative Litigation Decision]; 
see also Jiangsu Sheng Huaian Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Xingzheng Panjue Shu 
(江苏省淮安市中级人民法院行政判决书) [Jiangsu Province Huaian City Intermediate Peo-
ple’s Court Administrative Litigation Decision]; see also Huai Zhong Xing Zhongzi 
Di 0139 Hao (淮中行终字第0139号) [Huai Intermediate Administrative Final Decision] 
(2014). 
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tax agency penalty practices that evolved in the late 1990s were 
subject to court challenges, and such practices prevailed only after 
being codified in statute.134  Similarly, the authority of local tax in-
spection bureau to assess taxes was challenged until the late 1990s, 
and such authority was given statutory grounding in 2000 upon 
the revision of the Law on the Administration of Tax Collection.135  
Indeed, in this last set of disputes, tax authorities had seemed to be 
threatened with systematic defeat before the statute was changed, 
as the Chinese Supreme People’s Court had indicated that it be-
lieved that the law was not on the government’s side.136  
The claim here is not that in all these cases where the law was 
revised, the revision was a causal consequence of government de-
feats in courts or even of the government being challenged in 
courts.  It is instead that the government could ultimately protect 
itself against legal vulnerabilities in court by changing the law, and 
this is what Chinese tax authorities have often done.  In other 
words, there are two contrasting views regarding potential legal 
disputes between Chinese taxpayers and tax agencies.  One is that 
even if the taxpayer has strong legal arguments, no good will come 
from bringing such a dispute to court, because Chinese courts are 
not independent and the defendant tax agencies will retaliate.  The 
other is that if taxpayers have good legal arguments on a particular 
issue, then disputes on such issues are likely to arise often.  The 
government may hope that it will not be sued as a result of such 
disputes, and that if sued, the courts will side with it, but ultimate-
ly, disputes, lawsuits, and court defeats can be avoided only by 
changing the law.  Overall, existing case law provides more sup-
port for the second view rather than the first.137 
134  For discussion, see Wei Cui & Xiaoyu Ma, The Option to Sue: Hainan Orien-
tal Hotel v. Hainan Local Tax Bureau, 6 CHINA TAX INTELLIGENCE 20 (2011). 
135  See Li Gang (李刚), Quanguo Tongyi Shuishou Zhifa Wenshu Shiyang Ruogan 
Wenti Yanjiu (全国统一税收执法文书式样若干问题研究) [Investigation of Several Issues on the 
Style of the National Uniform Writ of Tax Collection], 12 CAISHUI FALUN CONG (财
税法论丛) [FINANCE AND TAX LAW] 178, 193–99 (2012) (discussing the evolution of 
this dispute). 
136  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Dui Fujian Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan “Guanyu 
Fujian Sheng Difang Shuiwu Ju Jicha Fenju Shifou Juyou Xingzheng Zhuti Zige de 
Qingshi Baogao” de Dafu Yijian 
(最高人民法院对福建省高级人民法院《关于福建省地方税务局稽查分局是否具有行政主体资格的请示报告》
的答复意见) [Supreme People’s Court Reply to the High People’s Court of Fujian 
Province Regarding the Inquiry of the Standing of Tax Inspection Office of Local 
Tax Bureau as the Administrative Body], Xing Ta [1999] 25 Hao (行他[1999]25号) 
[Xing Ta [1999] No. 25], (promulgated and effective on 21 October 1999). 
137 Not all disputes and litigated cases involve issues of policy implementa-
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4.3.  Summary 
To review:  if a Chinese taxpayer, considering bringing a law-
suit against a tax agency, hires a good lawyer to review published 
decisions in tax litigation, they would find that many prior litigants 
are normal businesses typical of what one finds in the marketplace.  
They would find courts considering some fairly sophisticated legal 
arguments advanced by both plaintiffs and defendants.  Courts 
hold against tax agencies with non-negligible frequency—in one 
fifth of the cases overall and one third of the penalty cases—but the 
odds of winning is evidently lower for plaintiffs than for defend-
ants.  The reasons why the plaintiffs lose, however, generally are 
not mysterious:  either the law simply seems not to be on their side, 
or tax agencies are enforcing policies and practices that are adverse 
to the plaintiffs and have inadequate basis in the law, but which 
presumably are applied to all taxpayers and not just the plaintiffs.  
Courts are reluctant to invalidate these informal practices (alt-
hough they occasionally do precisely that).  Aside from this, there 
is little general evidence for courts’ lack of neutrality or compe-
tence.  Adverse legal standards seem much more relevant than ju-
dicial attitude or quality.  Finally, and most importantly, if the tax-
payer and his lawyer are able to conclude that they have a strong 
case on the merits, there is nothing in the published cases (more 
than half of which involved pro se plaintiffs) that implies that they 
should preclude the litigation option. 
Why, then, do Chinese taxpayers tend not to bring suit?  Are 
legal standards so generally adverse to taxpayers that they rarely 
have a good case?138  How, then, do Chinese taxpayers normally 
survive?  The next part suggests what is likely to be a surprising 
answer to these questions. 
tion, of course.  But when they do not, government incentives for interference 
with independent adjudication seem even weaker. 
138 In Part 3, we saw that while some litigation procedural rules are adverse 
to taxpayer plaintiffs, they are probably insufficient to explain the low volume of 
litigation. 
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5. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT: THE HEART OF THE STORY
The social environment in which disputes arise clearly may af-
fect the volume of litigation.  Professors Ramseyer and Rasmusen 
noted, for example, that the number of pawn shops in Japan de-
clined dramatically from 1955 to the present, and as a result, the 
quantity of litigation pursued by Japanese creditors increased 
(since fewer creditors are pawnshops that could simply keep 
pawned objects of defaulting debtors).139  The challenge, though, is 
identifying such relevant features of the social environment when 
one’s scope of attention begins narrowly with the courts.  In the 
case of Chinese tax litigation, such a non-obvious, but potentially 
key, determinant of how disputes arise and are dealt with is the 
structure of tax administration.  
China’s workforce of tax administrators comprises approxi-
mately 756,000 civil servants.140  Although this is certainly the larg-
est tax bureaucracy in the world by absolute size,141 it is not in per 
capita terms:  the number of tax administrators relative to the size 
of the country’s general workforce is much lower than the OECD 
average.142  Notwithstanding this fact, the organization of China’s 
tax administration permits most business taxpayers to easily con-
tact tax collectors.  This is the result of what one might call radical 
“administrative decentralization”.143  The easiest way to appreciate 
what this means is to consider the vertical distribution of govern-
ment personnel—what proportions of civil servants are employed 
139 Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 8. 
140  OECD, TAX ADMINISTRATION 2015: COMPARATIVE INFORMATION ON OECD
AND OTHER ADVANCED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES 84 (2015) (Table 2.4). 
141  Id. 
142  See Appendix in Leslie Robinson & Joel Slemrod, Understanding Multidi-
mensional Tax Systems, 19 INT’L TAX PUB. FIN. 237 (2012) (analyzing OECD data to 
show that developed countries tend to have a much higher number of tax admin-
istrators relative to population than developing countries).   
143  Cui, supra note 20.  I define “administrative decentralization” by two fea-
tures of the state:  first, there is a single bureaucratic hierarchy, and government 
functions vis-a-vis citizens are performed at the lowest levels of the hierarchy.  By 
contrast, higher levels of the bureaucracy do not exercise government power with 
respect to citizens directly, but instead issue commands to bureaucratic subordi-
nates.  Second, the lower the bureaucratic rank, the smaller is the geographical 
reach of units in the rank.  Decentralization thus implies that the jurisdiction of a 
particular, citizen-facing government unit is geographically quite limited.  What is 
unusual about China is first, how deep (i.e. multilayered) the bureaucratic hierar-
chy is, and second, how resolutely the tasks of government administration are 
placed at the bottom ranks of the hierarchy.  Id. at 23.  
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at the various levels of government.  At the national level, China’s 
State Administration of Taxation (SAT) houses just over 800 staff 
members—a mere 0.1% of the army of tax administrators.  By way 
of contrast, in 2013 the U.S. Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) Na-
tional Office in Washington D.C. employed a staff of 4,072, out of a 
total IRS staff size of 86,977 (i.e. 4.68% of IRS staff work at the Na-
tional Office).144  At the next, provincial level, China’s tax bureau-
cracy has 11,000 employees.  Thus even when the national and 
provincial offices are combined, employees at these levels repre-
sent only 1.56% of the tax administration. 145  
Where then are China’s tax collectors?  Data compiled by the 
SAT shows that in 2003, 16% of tax administrators working at sub-
national levels were posted at prefectural/municipal tax bureaus, 
and an overwhelming 79.5% or more work at the county level or 
below.146  Arriving at a breakdown of personnel between the coun-
ty and lower levels takes some guess work, but the latter ranks 
contain at least as many employees as the county rank.147  
Imagine what the U.S. IRS would be like if it were structured 
like China’s tax bureaucracy.  First, there would be barely anyone 
in the Washington D.C. National Office.  There would also be no 
counterparts to the seven current IRS regional offices, each of 
which oversees matters across several states.148  Instead, the current 
139 IRS district offices, which are field offices directly dealing with 
taxpayers, would become high-level offices giving commands to 
three additional layers of subordinate offices, where most person-
nel would be located.  Most interestingly, these offices would form 
a dense network that is, so to speak, close to the ground.  Instead of 
having 20 Taxpayer Assistance Centers in the entire state of New 
144 In 2011, the IRS national office employed a staff of 4,569, out of the total 
IRS staff size of 94,709.  OECD, supra note 140, at 83 (Table 2.4). 
145 Id.  According to a recent OECD study of 52 countries, which covered thir-
ty-five OECD countries and seventeen non-OECD countries/regions, China has 
by far the smallest percentage of tax administration staff working either at head-
quarters (i.e. national) offices, or at national and regional offices combined. 
146  Cui, supra note 20. 
147  Therefore, if one visualizes Chinese tax administration in a pyramidal 
figure with five tiers (national, provincial, prefectural, county, and sub-county), 
the proportions of areas of the tiers from the top to the bottom would have the ra-
tios of 0.1:1.5:18.4:40:40.  The top two tiers would be barely visible. 
148  IRS, Chapter 13-1 – Exhibit 1 Regional Offices, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-
Employed/Chapter-13-1-Exhibit-1-Regional-Offices [https://perma.cc/9K4Y-
WHYE].  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
988 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:3 
York,149 for example, there would be 20 such centers just for upper 
Manhattan.150  Instead of having just two or three hundred field of-
fices in the entire country, there would be such a number of offices 
just in one metropolitan area.151   
The sheer density of this network of “grass-root” offices im-
plies that each of the offices that constitute the network’s nodes has 
a small geographical jurisdiction.  Taxpayers in each such small ju-
risdiction are thus in easy physical proximity to an office housing 
tax administrators.  What a local office tends to do also accentuates 
this proximity.  Although, nominally, the role of a local tax office is 
fairly comprehensive,152 in reality the bulk of a local office’s staff 
time and resources are devoted to a range of basic compliance 
tasks.  Relatively fine divisions of labor, for example, are found for 
managing taxpayer registration, ensuring the timely filing of tax 
returns and the very basic processing of such returns, ensuring 
prompt payment of taxes, dealing with refund claims, and issuing 
tax invoices.153  In addition, the local office is supposed to give 
publicity to tax law, and provide taxpayer education, training, and 
other services.154  Thus, instead of mailing one’s returns and writ-
ing checks to distant “return processing centers” as U.S. taxpayers 
149  IRS, Contact My Local Office in New York, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Aug. 
17, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Contact-My-Local-Office-in-New-York 
[https://perma.cc/L2TU-DNK3].  Similarly, the State of California has only 28 
such centers. 
150 The Dongcheng District in the City of Beijing 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dongcheng_District,_Beijing [https://perma.cc/
5ZMW-V6ZP]), for example, has a population of 0.9 million and a geographical 
area of forty square kilometers—which is roughly half the size of Manhattan in 
both population and area terms.  It has twenty taxpayer service centers. See Bei-
jing Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju (北京市国家税务局) [Beijing State Taxation Bureau], Dong-
cheng Qu Shuiwu Tingsuo (东城区税务厅所) [Dongcheng District Local Taxation Office], 
BEIJING SHI GUOJIA SHUIWU JU (北京市国家税务局) [BEIJING STATE TAXATION BUREAU] 
(Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.bjsat.gov.cn/bjsat/qxfj/dc/swts/.  
151 OECD, supra note 140 (Table 2.4) states that IRS has 139 “regional offices” 
and 119 “local/branch offices.”  The City of Beijing itself has more tax offices than 
this total number of 258. 
152 Cui, supra note 20, at 203–04. 
153 See, e.g., Shenzhen Shi Nanshan Qu Difang Shuiwu Ju (深圳
市南山区地方税务局) [Shenzhen Nanshan District Local Taxation Bureau], Shenzhen Shi 
Nanshan Qu Difang Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Shixiang Tiaozheng Gaozhi Shu 
(深圳市南山区地方税务局税务事项调整告知书) [Notice of the Shenzhen Nanshan District local 
taxation bureau regarding adjustments to tax-related matters], SHENZHEN SHI DIFANG 
SHUIWU JU (深圳市地方税务局) [SHENZHEN LOCAL TAXATION BUREAU] (Jul. 13, 2015), 
http://www.szds.gov.cn/wap/tzgg/201507/07d8debf75344486a2bd6a20453e5d0
9.shtml (detailing the functions and services provided by a local tax office).
154 Cui, supra note 20, at 204.
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do, and in addition to being able to dial up the equivalent of IRS 
service hotlines, Chinese taxpayers can handle their basic tax com-
pliance and obtain taxpayer services in their neighborhoods.  In 
short, tax administration in China possesses a “personal face” to a 
much greater extent than in many other countries.  
The origin of this organizational structure of Chinese tax ad-
ministration is complex.155  Suffice it to say that the purpose of this 
structure is not to provide face-to-face taxpayer service, but to col-
lect tax revenue in the main ways through which the government 
knows how.156  Moreover, by some measures this system has also 
worked well:  close contact with taxpayers has reduced the size of 
the informal sector in China to one of the smallest in the world and 
Chinese tax revenue has been growing at a faster pace than its GDP 
for almost two decades.157  But it has also had many unintended 
implications.  For our purposes here, the most important implica-
tion is for how Chinese taxpayer may choose to learn about and 
comply with tax law.  
Like taxpayers elsewhere, a Chinese taxpayer may consult gov-
ernment publications, acquire professional tax advice, or inquire 
with taxpayer service units within the tax administration to learn 
about tax law.  But in addition, because of the dense network of lo-
cal tax offices, he is also able to consult with the tax administrators 
in the neighborhood, whom he deals with during routine (e.g. 
weekly or monthly) tax compliance, regarding the latter’s view 
about how certain transactions should be handled.158  This latter 
option offers two significant advantages.  First, it is these officials 
who are most likely to be conducting any examination of the trans-
actions in question in the future.  Not only may the officials’ view 
now be a relevant predictor of their view in the future, but the offi-
155 It needs to be traced both to the Chinese government’s attempt to build a 
tax system to embrace a market-based economy in the 1980s and 1990s, and to the 
overall structure of the Chinese state. See id., at 235–36. 
156 In other words, physical proximity between Chinese taxpayers and tax 
collectors does not mean that the former get better taxpayer services than taxpay-
ers in other countries: the primary objective of any local tax office and of most lo-
cal office employees is still to collect revenue. 
157 Cui, supra note 20, at 194, 199. 
158  In many countries, only a small set of taxpayers, e.g. large corporations 
where audit teams from the tax agency are routinely stationed, have tax admin-
istration staff specifically assigned to them and deal with them on a routine basis.  
Taxpayers may have access to good taxpayer services, including having simple 
inquiries answered, but the government staff answering the inquiries are not the 
ones that will engage in audits and make tax assessments. 
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cials may also feel bound to some extent by their own advice to 
taxpayers, or at least be more reluctant to impose severe penalties 
if taxpayers turn out to owe additional taxes. In other words, con-
sulting the local tax official about tax law has advantages analo-
gous to obtaining an advanced ruling.159  Second, learning the law 
through local tax officials is also (considerably) cheaper than hiring 
tax advisors.  By relying on local tax officials for legal advice, tax-
payers effectively convert what would have been their compliance 
costs into the government’s administrative costs.160  
It is likely that many Chinese taxpayers precisely engage in 
such behavior.  Moreover, because the grass-root offices offer low 
career incentives to their employees and inadequate opportunities 
for specialization, it is likely that local tax administrators have ra-
ther imperfect knowledge of tax law.161  When this is the case, and 
when taxpayers do not independently learn the tax law, even the 
most “compliant” taxpayers are only “semi-compliant”: their com-
pliance activities are blessed by local tax administrators’ routine in-
tervention and (non-binding) advice, but may still substantially 
deviate from the requirements of law. 
Now consider a Chinese taxpayer’s incentives when a dispute 
with the local tax office arises.  First, the dispute would be viewed 
from both sides in the context of an ongoing, physically proximal, 
and frequently interactive relationship:  how the dispute is re-
solved is likely to affect future interactions, and both sides may 
prefer not to be burdened with continued adverse feelings.  More-
over, the prospect of future interactions also creates rooms for bar-
gaining in settlement.  Second, to litigate in court, or even to bring 
a dispute through a formal administrative review proceeding, both 
sides would need to come to terms with what the law requires.  
Many taxpayers, however, have precisely chosen not to do that in 
regular compliance. Instead, by choosing to rely on the local tax of-
fice for various compliance efforts, they have benefited from both 
savings on advisory and compliance costs and perhaps even direct 
tax savings resulting from the local tax collectors’ partial ignorance 
(or discretionary application) of the law.  Any taxpayer considering 
becoming a plaintiff, therefore, must be prepared to abandon this 
159 See Cui, supra note 20, at 223 (contrasting this type of ex ante consultation 
and advanced rulings systems available elsewhere). 
160  Indeed, when local tax offices engage in extensive tax return processing, 
they may even be perceived as an adequate substitute for professional tax return 
preparers by many businesses. 
161 Cui, supra note 20, at 211–14. 
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type of normal equilibrium.  These two factors—the greater oppor-
tunity for settlement due to repeated interactions and the desire 
that taxpayers may have for keeping to a particular type of compli-
ance practice—may both have powerful effects in suppressing 
formal dispute resolution strictly based on the law.  
Note that these explanations are distinct from the claim that 
taxpayers may hesitate to sue tax agencies for fear of retaliation.  
To begin, a tax agency’s ability to retaliate is presumably con-
strained by law:  if a taxpayer can sue an agency in the first place, it 
can sue the same agency for retaliatory actions that have no basis 
in law.  The question, then, is whether a defendant (especially one 
that loses) may retaliate within the bounds of law.  In China it is 
plausible that this is feasible, but the reason lies in the tax adminis-
trators’ deep involvement with most taxpayers’ normal compliance 
activities, and the frequency with which taxpayers benefit from 
such involvement.  It is not enough that the agency sued retains ju-
risdiction over the taxpayer;162 it must be the case that it delivers 
benefits to taxpayers that it could withdraw after being sued.  
Moreover, in the repeated interactions between taxpayers and tax 
administrators, it is also not just the government that can act stra-
tegically, e.g. by retaliating:  taxpayers can also choose different 
levels of cooperation in response to the government’s choices.  
Thus, it is at least as plausible to see the suppression of formal dis-
putes as resulting from the expanded space for bargaining and 
reaching settlement as it is to read such suppression as a reflection 
of government power.   
In summary, the low tax litigation volume in China may be ex-
plained by the atomistic structure of Chinese tax administration, 
which creates opportunities for frequent informal actions between 
taxpayers and tax administrators.  The logic of this explanation 
might extend to other regulatory areas, as well.  For example, it has 
been noted in a number of studies that in the sphere of environ-
mental protection, the level of environmental litigation (including 
administrative litigation) is so low that the maintenance of special-
ized environmental courts, which the Chinese government created 
in 2011, has been difficult to justify.163  It has similarly been noted 
that the penalties imposed on polluters and other violators of envi-
162 This is true for most tax systems in other countries. 
163  Xuehua Zhang et al., Agency Empowerment Through the Administrative Liti-
gation Law: Court Enforcement of Pollution Levies in Hubei Province, 202 CHINA Q. 307 
(2010); Stern, supra note 42. 
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ronmental law are far lower than can be expected from statutory 
provisions.164  Fewer scholars have recognized that the organiza-
tion of environment protection agencies in China is very decentral-
ized, in ways not dissimilar to the decentralization of tax admin-
istration discussed above.165  But it is plausible that such 
decentralization is also the culprit for low litigation in the envi-
ronmental area. 
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION AND THE RULE OF LAW
Among Chinese policymakers and legal scholars, it is conven-
tional wisdom that administrative litigation is not just a mecha-
nism for resolving disputes between private parties and govern-
ment entities, disputes that arise because of factual and legal 
disagreements and perhaps simply as a part of life.  Administrative 
litigation instead (and perhaps even primarily) serves the function 
of protecting the legal rights and interests of citizens from the en-
croachment of the government.  This imputed function implies that 
the government is prone to making such encroachment, and per-
haps more generally, to acting in ways that significantly deviate 
from what is required by the law.  This implied claim is certainly 
apt in characterizing many of the activities of the Chinese govern-
ment, which is far from being tamed by the rule of law.166  From 
this perspective, while citizens suing the government may or may 
not be acting purely in their own private interest, such lawsuits 
may generate a kind of social benefit beyond the private benefit for 
the plaintiffs:  administrative litigation may deter the government 
from much unlawful activity, or at least help the government to 
improve its operations through better alignment with the law.167  
164  Zhang et al., supra note 163. 
165  See Benjamin Van Rooij, Organization and Procedure in Environmental Law 
Enforcement: Sichuan in Comparative Perspective, 17 CHINA INFO. 36 (2003) (observ-
ing that one provincial environmental protection bureau may be too thinly 
staffed).  This phenomenon in fact exists across provinces and across agencies.  I 
discuss these cross-agency commonalities in Wei Cui, The Legal Maladies of “Feder-
alism, Chinese-Style”, in THE BEIJING CONSENSUS? HOW CHINA HAS CHANGED THE
WESTERN IDEAS OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL LEGAL 
PRACTICES (Weitseng Chen ed., 2017) 97-118. 
166  See POTTER, supra note 10. 
167  See SHAVELL, supra note 21, Chapter 17 (discussing the inevitable diver-
gence between the private incentives and social cost and benefits of litigation). 
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Although public law scholars may be unfamiliar with such a for-
mulation, the idea is that legal disputes with government agencies 
have strong positive externalities, as they promote a particular so-
cial good, namely the rule of law in governance.   
It is very likely for this reason that the Chinese government has 
heavily subsidized administrative litigation.  The subsidies take 
multiple forms.  At the level of individual disputes, court fees for 
administration litigation are negligible (fifty yuan or eight dollars 
per case).168  In the institutional dimension, separate tribunals with 
dedicated judges for hearing administrative law disputes are set 
up at courts at all levels, resulting in an average case load of fewer 
than forty per year for such tribunals.169  The judicial system also 
separately gathers and publishes data on administrative litigation, 
which made possible the analysis in Parts 2 and 3 supra.  Moreover, 
a large number of Chinese legal scholars specialize in research on 
how to make administrative litigation more effective at promoting 
the rule of law, for example by modifying the Administrative Liti-
gation Law to offer more plaintiff rights and remedies.170  As a part 
of the judicial apparatus that receives such targeted subsidies, ad-
ministrative litigation is clearly a distinct institution with a distinct 
purpose.   
In tax and many other areas, however, what paradoxically 
seems to be preventing this institution from serving its purpose is 
the shortage of plaintiffs.  Missing (often) are the very parties 
whose rights and interests administrative litigation is supposed to 
protect.  Courts cannot by themselves constrain government and 
promote the rule of law in the executive branch, unless private par-
ties spontaneously bring suits.  This point seems obvious, but it is 
also precisely ignored when one assumes that if only courts are 
168 Susong Fei Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费缴纳办法) [Measures Regarding Payment of 
Litigation Fee] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 19, 2006, effective April 1, 
2007), art. 13(5).  Attorney fees are also low. See Li, supra note 11, at 69.  
169  Cui & Wang, supra note 16. 
170  See generally 2 JIANG BIXIN (江必新) & LIANG FENGYUN (梁凤云), XINGZHENG
SUSONG FA LILUN YU SHIWU (行政诉讼法理论与实务) [THEORY & PRACTICE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW] (2011); He Haibo (何海波) ed., Lixiang de 
Xingzheng Susong Fa (理想的行政诉讼法) [The Ideal Administrative Litigation Law] (un-
published conference proceedings on file with the author); HE HAIBO (何海波) ET AL.
ED., FAZHI DE JIAOBU SHENG – ZHONGGUO XINGZHENG FA DA SHIJI (1978–2014) 
(法治的脚步声——中国行政法大事记(1978-2014)) [THE FOOTSTEP OF THE RULE OF LAW – THE 
CHRONICLE OF CHINA’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1978–2014)]; LIN LIHONG (林莉红) ED.,
XINGZHENG FAZHI DE LIXIANG YU XIANSHI (行政法治的理想与现实) [THE IDEAL AND 
REALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULE OF LAW] (2014). 
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more neutral, competent, and particularly more independent and 
“powerful” vis-à-vis the executive branch, or the procedures for lit-
igation are made more plaintiff-favorable, the lawsuits would nat-
urally happen.  The investigation carried out in this Article into the 
actual empirical patterns of Chinese tax litigation shows that this 
kind of assumption may have little justification in reality.  Just as 
subsidizing administrative litigation hasn’t made it the institution 
it is intended to be, improving judicial quality and independence 
may not, either.  The actions and choices of would-be-plaintiffs 
cannot be forgotten.   
The empirical considerations discussed in Parts 3 to 5 suggest 
two reasons why administrative litigation may be deprived of its 
significance.  The first, more straightforward, reason is that the 
laws that courts would enforce may be unfavorable to would-be 
plaintiffs:  the judiciary cannot uphold rights that private parties 
do not have.  Thus if Chinese tax law imposes many compliance 
requirements on taxpayers, taxpayers who flunk such require-
ments cannot expect much by way of judicial remedy.  
The second, more profound reason why the significance of ad-
ministrative litigation may diminish is that private parties may 
themselves benefit from, come to terms with, and perpetuate a so-
cial order that is inconsistent with the rule of law.  Most obviously, 
thieves, tax evaders, polluters, unscrupulous merchants, and op-
portunistic businesses all benefit from ineffective law enforcement.  
But equally importantly, many private citizens may prefer to be 
spared the costs of learning and complying with the law, if they 
have the opportunity to do so.  As discussed in Part 5, if taxpayers 
can obtain a significant amount of free tax advice and free assis-
tance with return preparation at a local tax office—even if offering 
such free services is not the intended function of such offices—they 
may happily follow the personal discretion of the local civil serv-
ants, particularly if they don’t end up paying more tax.  Indeed, 
they may actively seek access to such discretion, more than they try 
to learn about the law.  When incentives for doing so are pervasive, 
“constraining government” may often not felt by citizens to be in 
their own interest.  They may readily leave their supposed rights 
simply on the books.  
While it may ultimately be the government’s responsibility to 
put an end to this kind of non-rule-based social practice, it is im-
portant to recognize that the problem here is that the rule of law 
has failed in a much more fundamental sense than unconstrained 
(or under-constrained) government:  the failure rather lies in there 
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being no publicly announced legal rules that are generally fol-
lowed.  The making and publicizing of legal rules, and achieving 
general compliance with these rules, form the pre-conditions of 
and general backgrounds to large-scale social coordination in 
many countries (democratic or authoritarian) in the 21st century.  
They are also pre-conditions of the functioning of judicial institu-
tions in these countries.  Where both the government and private 
citizens opt for personal discretion and informal bargaining in-
stead of rule-based social practices, courts that are supposed to en-
force legal rules may end up being little used. 
Of course, it is not only Chinese policymakers and legal schol-
ars who tend to identify judicial monitoring of executive action as 
the locus for promoting the rule of law.  The idea of “rule of law” is 
frequently associated with “constraining government” in discours-
es around the world.  This Article has shown, however, that be-
cause the very possibility of judicial monitoring is conditional up-
on plaintiffs bringing suit, and because whether plaintiffs bring 
suit in the first place may depend on whether legal rules are gener-
ally being complied with by private citizens and effectively en-
forced by the government—that is, whether legal rules guide social 
and economic life—the rule of law is far from being synonymous 
with “constraining government.”  
As mentioned in the Introduction, some scholars studying ad-
ministrative litigation have also taken theoretical perspectives dif-
ferent from the one just described.  They see administrative litiga-
tion as a distinctive institution, but not because it (purportedly) 
produces a distinctive public good, namely more rule of law in 
governance (or a more constrained government).  Instead, in the 
context of authoritarian regimes, they see administrative litigation 
either as furnishing a meaningful tool for the “principals” in the 
regimes to monitor the actions of their “agents,”171 or as an inad-
vertent opening for those who oppose the regimes to pursue politi-
cal contest.172  In the former case, a narrative is then developed to 
predict how authoritarian regimes may choose among different 
forms of monitoring.  In the latter case, a new kind of normative 
significance, beyond the rule of law, is bestowed upon administra-
tive litigation:  such litigation may undermine authoritarianism it-
self.  
The weaknesses of these theoretical claims, which can be seen 
171 Ginsburg, supra note 4. 
172 O’Brien & Li, supra note 5. 
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readily purely in conceptual terms, are put into sharp relief by con-
sidering the realities of administrative litigation.  The main prob-
lem with the “third-party monitoring for the benefit of dictators” 
story is that the objective of such monitoring is presumably catch-
ing malfeasance by agents of the authoritarian regime.173  Howev-
er, it is not clear why courts are particularly adept at catching offi-
cial malfeasance, especially when administrative litigation 
proceedings and not criminal prosecution are involved.174  Moreo-
ver, since courts are reactive, plaintiffs are needed to detect the in-
stances of malfeasance first. The key “third party” in judicial moni-
toring, in other words, is the plaintiff, not the judge.  It is not clear 
that the remedies that courts typically provide to plaintiffs in ad-
ministrative litigation give distinctively strong incentives for moni-
toring official malfeasance.  Given these facts, whistleblower or 
ombudsman systems with rewards appear much more suitable for 
the purpose of third-party monitoring from the perspective of au-
thoritarian principals.  The choice of administrative litigation for 
such purpose would be inexplicable.  
As to the story of administrative litigation as a form of political 
contest, the overwhelming evidence from China is that citizens do 
not see things that way.  As heavily subsidized as the institution of 
administrative litigation is, it is still infrequently used in many are-
as.  Chinese citizens’ disinclination to challenge one of the most 
pervasive—and purposefully extractive—branches of the govern-
ment, namely taxation, is hard to ignore.  Instead of citizens using 
a seemingly neutral and apolitical channel—that of law—to pursue 
political purposes, the very functioning of administrative litigation 
as a legal mechanism is threatened by its disuse, for reasons that 
have no discernible connection with politics. 
7. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this Article, I presented a contrast in how ad-
ministrative litigation is viewed in democracies with established 
rule of law, on the one hand, and in countries that are character-
ized either by authoritarianism or by deficient legal systems, on the 
173 Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 11. 
174 They would be, if the errant agents tend to disguise their misconduct 
through the complexity of legal rules, but there is no reason to believe that this is 
the case. 
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other.  In the former context, administrative litigation often does 
not stand out as a distinctive institution, but instead merges seam-
lessly into a background characterized by the rule of law.  In the 
latter, administrative litigation is often portrayed as an aspirational 
institution, as capable of either promoting the rule of law or un-
dermining authoritarianism.  Consequently, it may be showered 
with subsidies (sometimes even by the governments it is supposed 
to reform themselves) and highlighted for political support by in-
ternational rule of law initiatives.  An implicit assumption underly-
ing these different manners of (and motivations for) endorsing 
administrative litigation is that a weak judiciary will undermine 
that institution, and that to enhance it, one needs to empower the 
judiciary. 
This Article, by analyzing the determinants of administrative 
litigation patterns in a context characterized by authoritarianism 
and a rule of law deficit, has questioned the justifiability of thus 
privileging the judiciary.  It appears that the behaviors of litigants, 
as well as the laws that courts are supposed to enforce, have more 
explanatory power insofar as some core litigation outcomes are 
concerned.  Moreover, by highlighting the causes of the disuse of 
administrative litigation, it has questioned an even deeper and 
more widely-held assumption, namely that the rule of law should 
be identified with judicial constraints on the executive.  
 This Article resembles previous revisionist scholarship that 
employs a generally applicable conceptual framework, combined 
with empirical analysis, to penetrate a self-enclosed, self-sustaining 
discourse about a particular legal system.  For example, using simi-
lar methods, Professors Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen force-
fully challenged “cultural models” of the Japanese legal system 
and common wisdom about litigation patterns in that system.175  
The discourse on Chinese administration litigation studied here is 
similar to the discourse Professors Ramseyer and Rasmusen criti-
cize in that the discourses’ participants rarely consider whether the 
175  See J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement 
Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989) (demonstrating 
that rational choice models used in the U.S. can explain litigation choices in Japan 
without resorting to “cultural” models, and that “claims that Japanese courts are 
so expensive, powerless, and slow that they effectively deny relief to victims of 
legal wrongs” are unfounded); Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 15 (using em-
pirical analysis of Japanese judges’ careers to demonstrate the falseness of popular 
wisdom that low plaintiff win rates in Japanese tax litigation are due to the gov-
ernment’s manipulation of the judicial apparatus to obtain decisions biased in its 
favor). 
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explanations offered can apply in other legal systems, or fare better 
than alternative explanations in predictive power.  But the stakes 
in this study are higher, since the Chinese discourse about admin-
istrative litigation has been taken to inform thinking about the rela-
tionship between the rule of law and authoritarian regimes in gen-
eral.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss3/4
